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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900218-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. 
section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (jurisdiction over criminal convictions less 
than first degree felonies). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, is 
it permissible to consider the officer's state of mind in 
determining whether his pretextual behavior violates the accused's 
right against unreasonable search and seizure? 
2. Viewing all circumstances, including Officer 
Hedenstrom's subjective state of mind, were the stop, search, and 
seizure pretextual? 
3. Under traditional Fourth Amendment standards, were the 
stop, search and seizure pretextual? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Findings of fact are reversed when they are clearly in 
error, and conclusions of law are reversed when they are incorrect. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 108 
Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah 1989). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and constitutional provisions will 
be relied upon, and are contained in Appendix 1: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, section 14 
United States Constitution, Amendment Four 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Velasquez was charged with two counts of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance (R. 8-9). 
On March 6, 1990, Mr. Velasquez filed a motion to suppress 
evidence seized by the police, relying on Article I section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution (R. 25-26). The hearing on this motion was held on 
March 20, 1990, after which hearing the court denied the motion to 
suppress (R. 28-33). A copy of the trial court's memorandum 
decision denying the motion to suppress is included in Appendix 2 to 
this brief. 
On March 22, 1990, Mr. Velasquez entered a conditional no 
contest plea to one count of unlawful possession of a controlled 
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substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann 
section 58-37-8 (T. 23-34; R. 36-43). 
Acting pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 
1988), the trial court accepted the conditional plea, which was 
conditioned on the appeal of the trial court,s denial of Mr. 
Velasquez's motion to suppress (T. 23-34; R. 36-43). The trial 
court stayed the sentencing of Mr. Velasquez pending this appeal (T. 
31) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Salt Lake City police officer Allen Hedenstrom testified 
that on November 30, 1989, he saw a car being parked at 
approximately 951 South State Street, and that he noticed the car 
had mismatched license plates (T. 4). Officer Hedenstrom did not 
approach the car when he saw it being parked and noticed the 
mismatched plates, but pulled the car over when he saw it a second 
time, when he and another officer in a separate car were parked at 
252 East, 900 South (T. 3). 
While Officer Hedenstrom purported to stop Mr. Velasquez7s 
car because the mismatched license plates constituted a violation of 
the car registration requirements,1 Officer Hedenstrom did not cite 
1
 Utah Code Ann. section 41-1-43 provides in pertinent 
part: 
(1) The department, upon registering a 
vehicle, shall issue to the owner one 
registration plate for a motorcycle, trailer, or 
(continued) 
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Mr. Velasquez for the improper license plates, indicating, "The rear 
plate was the correct plate." (T. 12). Officer Hedenstrom did not 
testify about when he ascertained that the rear plate was correct 
(for example, if he called in the registration after he noticed the 
car parking on 9th South and State Street, and before the stop). 
After Officer Hedenstrom stopped Mr. Velasquez's car, Mr. 
Velasquez "was asked for a driver's license and registration,"2 and 
Mr. Velasquez indicated that he did not have a driver's license 
(T. 5). The officer testified that as identification, Mr. Velasquez 
showed Officer Hedenstrom a traffic citation issued to Jeff 
(footnote 1 continued) 
semitrailer and two identical registration plates 
for every other motor vehicle. The plates shall be 
issued to the particular vehicle licensed and may 
not be removed during the term for which the plate 
is issued, or used upon any other vehicle than the 
registered vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. section 41-1-142 defines the following offense 
relating to indicia of vehicle registration. 
(1) It is a class B misdemeanor: 
(e) to operate upon any public highway of this 
state any vehicle required by law to be registered 
without having the license plate or plates securely 
attached, and the registration card issued by the 
department to denote registration carried in the 
vehicle, except that the registration card issued by 
the department to all trailers and semitrailers 
shall be carried in the towing vehicle[.] 
2
 Officer Hedenstrom frequently testified in passive 
voice, and it is thus difficult to determine the identity of the 
actor. For example, in this instance, it cannot be determined if 
Officer Hedenstrom or the other officer, Officer Mosier, asked for 
Mr. Velasquez's license and registration. 
- 4 -
Martinez, which Mr. Velasquez had previously received for "no 
driver's license" (T. 5). 3 
Officer Hedenstrom could not recall whether Mr. Velasquez 
produced proper registration for the car, but arrested Mr. Velasquez 
for "no driver's license" (T. 6). 
After Mr. Velasquez was placed in Officer Mosier's patrol 
car with Officer Mosier (T. 8), Officer Smith searched the car and a 
closed cash box inside the car on the floor in front of the driver's 
seat, which box contained controlled substances (T. 7). 
Prior to and during the search of the car, Mr. Velasquez 
apparently was not taken by Officer Mosier (who had a separate 
patrol car from Officer Hedenstrom's) to the police station for "no 
license", but apparently was held until the search was complete - he 
was booked for "no license" and for possession of a controlled 
substance (8-9). Officer Hedenstrom indicated that Mr. Velasquez 
was also charged with "false information" because he gave the police 
several different names (T. 9). The arrest warrant lists only two 
counts of possession of controlled substances, the same counts 
listed in the information (R. 7-9). 
Officer Hedenstrom indicated that there was no policy 
mandating arrest for "no license", and that the decision to arrest 
was within his discretion (T. 9-10). 
3
 The record is never clear as to whether "no driver's 
license" refers to Mr. Velasquez's failure to carry his driver's 
license, or to his driving without ever having obtained a license. 
- 5 
Without producing any supporting documentation, Officer 
Hedenstrom indicated that his department's policy required that 
Mr. Velasquez's car be impounded upon his arrest (T. 6). 
When Officer Hedenstrom was asked the basis for the search, 
he indicated that the search was an inventory search and incident to 
Mr. Velasquez's arrest (T. 10).4 It is unclear whether Officer 
Hedenstrom filled out an inventory sheet, and no inventory sheet was 
4
 Officer Hedenstrom's testimony is confusing. It is 
unclear whether Officer Hedenstrom meant the search was incident to 
arrest, or was an inventory search pursuant to the impound which was 
necessitated by the arrest: 
Q ... I take it what you are saying, although 
you haven't used the term, you are saying that you 
conducted an inventory search? 
A That is correct, and a search incident to 
his arrest. 
Q And a search incident to his arrest? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Was that search of his person? 
A His person was searched. 
Q And so you are saying the search incident to 
the arrest was a search of the vehicle incident to 
his arrest; is that correct? 
A And his person. That is why the vehicle was 
being impounded, he was arrested. 
Q Well, what I am getting at, I want to know 
what the scope of the search was, if you are saying 
it was incident to arrest? 
A He was arrested, the vehicle was going to be 
impounded. It was searched. 
(T. 10-11). 
The prosecutor argued strictly that the search was an 
inventory search (T. 15, 17, 19), and the trial court's ruling 
characterized the search as an inventory search, and not as a search 
incident to arrest (R. 31-32). 
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presented by the prosecution.5 
The prosecution presented neither documentation nor 
specific testimony concerning the Salt Lake City Police policy on 
inventory searches. The discussion of the policy was as follows: 
Q What is the policy of your department 
regarding vehicle impounds in these situations? 
A The vehicles are searched prior to the 
impound for valuables and any evidence. 
(T. 6)(emphasis added). 
Q In what ways, Officer Hedenstrom, did you 
deviate from your department policy on an inventory 
search? 
A None whatsoever. 
(T. 14). 
(T. 11). 
5
 Again, Officer Hedenstrom testified in passive voice: 
Q Now, in terms of did you fill out any logs 
or any property sheets concerning inventory of the 
vehicle? 
A There is an impound sheet filled out, yes, 
sir. 
Q Do you have that with you? 
A No, sir, I don't. 
Q And you are the one that filled that out? 
A That is correct. 
Q The impound sheet or the sheet that would 
have indicated the inventory of the vehicle, I take 
it you didn't keep a copy of that then? 
A No, sir, I don't have a copy. 
Q It hasn't been provided in the police 
reports? 
A No, sir, it is not with the police reports. 
(T. 14). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, in 
cases involving pretexts, examination of the officer's subjective 
intent is appropriate. 
Viewing all of the circumstances in this case, including 
Officer Hedenstrom's subjective intent, the stop, search and seizure 
were pretextual. Officer Hedenstrom's claim that he stopped the car 
because it was improperly registered, as evidenced by the mismatched 
license plates, is undermined in two ways. First, Officer 
Hedenstrom did not approach Mr. Velasquez concerning the improper 
indicia of registration when he first observed it, when the car was 
in the process of parking on State Street. Second, Officer 
Hedenstrom did not cite Mr. Velasquez for improper indicia of 
registration. 
Under traditional federal Fourth Amendment standards, 
Officer Hedenstrom's stop and search of Mr. Velasquez's car were 
pretextual. Officer Hedenstrom does not stop cars with mismatched 
license plates as a matter of course and the State presented no 
evidence that other officers routinely stop cars for mismatched 
license plates. 
Assuming arguendo that the stop was proper, the search was 
an improper pretextual search. The search was not a valid search 
incident to arrest because Mr. Velasquez was secured in a patrol car 
at the time it took place. The State failed to demonstrate that the 
impound was proper. The State failed to present sufficient evidence 
that Officer Hedenstrom was acting pursuant to an inventory policy, 
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and did not present any evidence that the policy in question 
specified that closed containers should be opened during an 
inventory search. The search was not a valid inventory search, 
because Officer Hedenstrom testified that one of his purposes in 
conducting the search was to gather evidence. 
Because the stop, search, and seizure were in violation of 
Mr. Velasquez's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, this 
Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Mr. Velasquez's 
motion to suppress, and reverse Mr. Velasquez's conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
UNDER ARTICLE I SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, 
EVIDENCE OF A POLICE OFFICER'S PRETEXTUAL INTENT IS 
A RELEVANT CONSIDERATION IN PRETEXT CASES. 
A. THIS COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THE CASE LAW UNDER THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
In State v. Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah 1990), the 
Utah Supreme Court for the first time departed from federal 
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution 
in creating independent state law under Article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. The basis for the court's action was the need to 
clarify an area of search and seizure law that had grown confusing 
and unworkable in the federal courts. See id. at 20-26. 
As is discussed below, the law concerning the role of an 
officer's subjective state of mind in pretext cases is confused and 
in need of similar clarification. 
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Mr. Velasquez asserts that under Article I section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution, evidence of the officer's state of mind is 
relevant to the inquiry surrounding an allegation of a pretextual 
search and seizure activity, and this Court should explicitly so 
recognize in this case. 
B. CURRENT CASE LAW IS CONFUSING. 
The role of subjective intent of the officer in pretext 
cases involves a great deal of confusing case law, and has spawned a 
fair amount of scholarly debate. Appendix 3 to this brief contains 
a recent article giving an overview of the case law and commentary, 
Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never Leaving," 
66 U. Detroit L.Rev. 363 (1989), hereinafter "Burkoff article".6 
In the State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1990), this 
Court explicitly stated that the subjective intent of the officer is 
irrelevant, and repeatedly emphasized that the inquiry under the 
Fourth Amendment must be objective. Id. at 977-979 and n. 3. This 
6
 For additional discussions of the case law and the 
various modes of interpreting pretextual searches and seizures, see 
the following articles cited by LaFave: Burkoff, "The Pretext Search 
Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 523 
(1984); Burkoff, "Bad Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70 (1982); A. 
Eisemann Note, 63 B.U.L.Rev. 223 (1983); Haddad, "Pretextual Fourth 
Amendment Activity: Another Viewpoint," 18 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 639 
(1985); and Burkoff, "Rejoinder: Truth, Justice and the American Way 
- Or Professor Haddad's 'Hard Choices,'" 18 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 695 
(1985). See also LaFave, Search and Seizure, section 1.4, pages 80 
through 97, and pages 12 through 14 of the supplement; section 
5.2(e), pages 456 through 461 and pages 47 through 48 of the 
supplement; section 7.5(e), pages 141 through 145 and pages 15 and 
16 of the supplement. 
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objective approach has been followed in subsequent cases. E.g., 
State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah App. 1989). 
Federal case law on the role of subjective intent evidence 
is confusing. The Sierra Court's objective assessment rule is an 
accurate quotation of Scott v. United States. 436 U.S. 128 (1978), 
"Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has 
occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the 
officer's actions in light of the facts and 
circumstances confronting him at the time,7 and 
not on the officer's actual state of mind at the 
time the challenged action was taken." Maryland 
v. Macon. 472 U.S. 463, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783, 86 
L.Ed. 2d 370 (1985)(quoting Scott v. United 
States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978)). 
754 P.2d at 977.7 
In cases prior to8 and subsequent to Scott,9 the Court has 
7
 It is arguable that the objectivity rule in Scott is 
dicta, see Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never 
Leaving," 66 U.Detroit L.Rev. 363, 366-368 (1989)(in Appendix 3 to 
this brief); Burkoff, "Bad Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70, 
83-84 (1982); Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, 
Now You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 523 (1984); and that the legal 
underpinnings of that dicta are wanting, see LaFave Search and 
Seizure, section 1.4, pages 81-83; A. Eisemann Note, 63 B.U.L.Rev. 
223, 242-244 (1983); Burkoff, "Bad Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 
70 (1982). 
8
 For examples of pre-Scott cases condoning the use of 
evidence of an officer's subjective intent, see e.g. Jones v. United 
States. 357 U.S. 493, 500 (1958)(government may not assert basis for 
warrantless search that is contradicted by evidence of the officers' 
actual "purpose"); Abel v. United States. 362 U.S. 217, 226, 230 
(1960)(record did not support claim that I.N.S. officers were 
exercising deportation powers as a pretext to facilitate F.B.I, 
espionage investigation; "The test is whether the decision to 
proceed administratively toward deportation was influenced by, and 
was carried out for, a purpose of amassing evidence in the 
prosecution for crime."); Ker v. California. 374 U.S. 23, 42-43 
(1963) ("While an arrest may not be used merely as the pretext for a 
search without warrant,... the record supports both that the 
(footnotes 8 and 9 continued) 
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evaluated the subjective intent of the officer in determining 
whether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred; but in other 
cases, the Court has repeated the objectivity rule relied on by this 
(footnote 8 continued) 
officers entered the apartment for the purpose of arresting George 
Ker and that they had probable cause[.]"); South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976)(in upholding an inventory search, the Court 
noted, "[T]here is no suggestion whatever that this standard 
procedure, essentially like that followed throughout the country, 
was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive."). 
Commentary on these and other pre-Scott subjective intent 
Fourth Amendment cases can be found in the following articles: 
Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never Leaving," 
66 U.Detroit L.Rev. 363, 366-367 (1989)(in Appendix 3 to this 
brief); Burkoff, "Bad Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70, 75-81 
(1982); Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now 
You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 523, 544-546 (1984); A. Eisemann 
Note, 63 B.U.L.Rev. 223, 242-244 (1983). 
9
 For examples of post-Scott cases condoning the use of 
evidence of an officer's subjective intent, see e.g. Colorado v. 
Bannister. 449 U.S. 1, 4 n.4 (1980)(per curiam)("There was no 
evidence whatsoever that the officer's presence to issue a traffic 
citation was a pretext to confirm any other previous suspicion about 
the occupants."); Steaqald v. United States. 451 U.S. 204, 215 
(1981)(in holding that police may not search a third party's home 
for the subject of an arrest warrant in the absence of a search 
warrant, the Court noted that if the Court held to the contrary, 
arrest warrants might be abused in pretext searches); Michigan v. 
Clifford. 464 U.S. 287, 292 (1984)(plurality opinion)(one factor 
used to determine the validity of warrantless administrative 
searches by fire investigators is "whether the object of the search 
is to determine the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of 
criminal activity."); Colorado v. Bertine. 479 U.S. 367, 371, 372 
(1987)(in upholding an inventory search, the Court noted, "[T]here 
was no showing that the police, who were following standardized 
procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of 
investigation."); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85, 87 
(1987)(if officers with an overbroad warrant knew it was overbroad, 
a search conducted in conformity with the warrant would be invalid; 
"While the purposes justifying a police search strictly limit the 
(continued) 
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Court in Sierra,10 
Utah case law following the federal precedents is also 
confusing. It seems that while this Court maintains that reference 
to the officer's subjective state of mind is inappropriate, in 
practice, the Court has found reference to the officer's subjective 
state of mind helpful in assessing allegations of pretext stops. 
(footnote 9 continued) 
permissible extent of the search, the Court has also recognized the 
need to allow some latitude for honest mistakes that are made by 
officers in the dangerous and difficult process of making arrests 
and executing search warrants."); O'Connor v. Ortega. 480 U.S. 709, 
729 (1987)(plurality opinion)(remanding the case to determine the 
purpose of those conducting the search). 
Commentary on these and other post-Scott subjective intent 
Fourth Amendment cases can be found in the following articles: 
Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never Leaving," 
66 U.Detroit L.Rev. 363, 394-408 (1989)(in Appendix 3 to this 
brief); Burkoff, "Bad Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70, 81-83 
(1982); Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now 
You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 523, 546-548 (1984); A. Eisemann 
Note, 63 B.U.L.Rev. 223, 244 (1983). 
1U
 For examples of post-Scott cases reiterating Scott's 
objectivity rule, see e.g. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 
U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983)(Court found that statute authorizing 
administrative search of vessels justified the search, rejecting as 
improper argument the assertion that the officers were actually 
searching for a reason unrelated to the statute, to find evidence of 
suspected drug traffic); Maryland v. Macon. 472 U.S. 463, 471 
(1985)(quoting the objectivity rule, finding that the subjective 
intent of the officer did not "transform" the objectively viewed 
proper police conduct into a Fourth Amendment violation). 
Commentary on these and other post-Scott objective intent 
Fourth Amendment cases can be found in the following articles: 
Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never Leaving," 
66 U.Detroit L.Rev. 363, 369-372 (1989)(in Appendix 3 to this 
brief); Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now 
You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 523, 524-525, 528-532 (1984). 
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E.g. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990)("Furthermore, 
unlike the officer in Sierra, Trooper Avery was not suspicious of 
Mr. Marshall for other reasons before the stop, had not followed him 
in order to find some reason to pull him over, and before the 
alleged violation occurred, had not radioed for help thereby 
indicating he intended to stop the vehicle."); State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 979-980 (Utah App. 1988)("Our conclusion that a reasonable 
officer would not have stopped Sierra for traveling in the left lane 
is buttressed by the events preceding Officer Smith's seizure of 
Sierra's automobile. As previously stated, Officer Smith was 
suspicious of Sierra before he observed Sierra commit any purported 
traffic violation. He had radioed for a computer check of the car's 
license plate but found it was not stolen. Nevertheless, he radioed 
for back-up assistance and exceeded the posted speed limit to catch 
Sierra."). See also Burkoff article at 375 and n. 56 (citing four 
Utah cases in which "motivational evidence" is used in pretext 
cases); State v. Lovearen and Southern, Case No. 890350-CA (Utah 
App. slip opinion filed Sept. 11, 1990) at 3 and n.3 (examining the 
officer's actual purpose) and at 7 n.10 ("While the individual 
officer's own practice may well be probative of what the 
hypothetical reasonable officer would do under the circumstances, 
his characterization of his intent at the time is essentially 
irrelevant.")(emphasis added, citation omitted). But see State v. 
Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah App. 1989)(disregarding the 
motivation of the officer, apparently because a traffic violation 
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was actually committed and a hypothetical officer would have made 
the stop). 
C. UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THE SUBJECTIVE INTENT OF AN OFFICER 
SHOULD BE ONE FACTOR OPEN TO CONSIDERATION IN PRETEXT CASES. 
Under Scott, the subjective intent of the officer is not 
entirely irrelevant. The Court stated, 
This is not to say, of course, that the 
question of motive plays absolutely no part in 
the suppression inquiry. On occasion, the motive 
with which the officer conducts an illegal search 
may have some relevance in determining the 
propriety of applying the exclusionary rule. For 
example, in United States v. Janis. 428 U.S. 
433, 458, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046, 96 S.Ct. 3021 (1976), 
we ruled that evidence unconstitutionally seized 
by state police could be introduced in federal 
civil tax proceedings because "the imposition of 
the exclusionary rule . . . is unlikely to 
provide significant, much less substantial, 
additional deterrence. It falls outside the 
offending officer's zone of primary interest." 
See also United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 
268, 276-277, 55 L.Ed.2d 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054 
(1978). This focus on intent, however, becomes 
relevant only after it has been determined that 
the Constitution was in fact violated. We also 
have little doubt that as a practical matter the 
judge's assessment of the motives of the officers 
may occasionally influence his judgment regarding 
the credibility of the officers' claims with 
respect to what information was or was not 
available to them at the time of the incident in 
question. But the assessment and use of motive 
in this limited manner is irrelevant to our 
analysis of the questions at issue in this case. 
Id. at 139 n. 13.11 
1 1
 For criticism of this two-step approach (which has not 
been applied consistently, see cases in footnotes 8 through 10 of 
this brief), see Burkoff, "The Court that Swallowed the Fourth 
Amendment," 58 Ore.L.Rev. 151, 187-190 (1979). 
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It appears that there is no Scott two-step inquiry 
(involving the existence of a violation, and then involving the 
applicability of the exclusionary rule) limiting the relevance of 
the officer's subjective intent under Utah law. In State v. 
Larocco. 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah 1990), the Court explicitly 
held that under the Utah Constitution, "exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of 
article I section 14." Id. at 25 (emphasis added). But see Larocco 
at 26 (indicating that further development of the exclusionary rule 
under the State Constitution might lead to recognition of exceptions 
to the rule). 
If evidence of the officer's state of mind is to be ignored 
in the application of the deterrent exclusionary rule, it seems that 
resort to less reliable and relevant criteria becomes necessary. Is 
the pretext inquiry logically focused on whether a traffic violation 
actually occurred? Compare State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979 ("[W]e 
are unable to assess whether Sierra even violated Utah's left-lane 
provisions. The trial judge did not find that Sierra had violated 
any traffic statutes.") with Sierra at 978-979 (recognizing that 
even actual traffic violations may be used as subterfuge 
justifications for pretextual stops). Is the pretext inquiry 
logically focused on whether the traffic violation is legally 
prohibited? Compare State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App. 
1990)("Courts consistently have held that a police officer can stop 
a vehicle when he or she believes the vehicle's safety equipment is 
not functioning properly.")(emphasis added) with State v. Sierra. 
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754 P.2d 972, 978 (Utah App. 1988)("The proper inquiry does not 
focus on whether the officer could validly have made the 
stop.")(emphasis original). Is the pretext inquiry logically 
focused on the frequency with which similar stops have been made by 
the officer in question or other officers or whether it might have 
been made by a fictional officer? See State v. Arroyo. 770 P.2d 
153, 155 and n. 2 (noting that the officer in question and other 
officers do not frequently stop cars for the violation in question); 
Burkoff, "Bad Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70, 110 (1982) 
(noting that standard police practices may be unconstitutional, that 
there may be valid reasons to depart from standard police practices 
that have nothing to do with pretextual motivations). 
While an officer's subjective intent alone may not 
establish whether the stop was or was not a pretext, see Terry v. 
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968), it is certainly a germane factor to be 
considered in determining whether a pretextual violation of rights 
against unreasonable searches and seizures has occurred. 
II. 
REVIEW OF ALL OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES DEMONSTRATES 
THE PRETEXTUAL NATURE OF THE STOP, SEARCH AND SEIZURE. 
In evaluating this case, this Court should conclude that 
the stop, search and seizure of Mr. Velasquez were pretextual. 
When Officer Hedenstrom first saw Mr. Velasquez's car being 
parked and noticed the mismatched plates, it appears that he did not 
investigate (T. 4). It was only when Officer Smith saw the car 
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later, driving down the street, that he chose to investigate.12 
Officer Hedenstrom did not cite Mr. Velasquez for the 
improper license plates (T. 8-9), testifying alternately that the 
plates were illegal and that the plates were acceptable (T. 11-21). 
Finally, Officer Hedenstrom's testimony that impound 
inventories are by policy designed to search for valuables "and any 
evidence" (T. 6) demonstrates a pretextual state of mind on the part 
of the officer. See State v. Hvcrh, 711 P.2d 264, 267-268 (Utah 
1985) (to qualify as inventory search, search must not be 
investigatory). 
III. 
UNDER TRADITIONAL FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS, 
THE STOP, SEARCH AND SEIZURE WERE PRETEXTUAL. 
A. THE STOP WAS PRETEXTUAL. 
1. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW GOVERNING PRETEXTUAL 
ACTIONS OF POLICE IN SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES. 
In Mr. Velasquez's motion to suppress the evidence, he 
specifically alleged that Officer Hedenstrom's stop of his car was 
12 of course, it is possible that Officer Hedenstrom 
called in the license plate number when he saw the car parking on 
State Street. He testified at trial that the reason that he did not 
cite Mr. Velasquez for the mismatched plates was that the rear 
license plate was proper and that the front license plate was issued 
to the registered owner (T. 11-12). Officer Hedenstrom never 
indicated when he determined that the rear plate was proper. 
If Officer Hedenstrom did make the investigatory license 
check when he first saw Mr. Velasquez's car parking on State Street 
and failed to cite Mr. Velasquez at that time, his later stop of 
Mr. Velasquez at 252 East 900 South for the stated purpose of 
investigating the mismatched license plates was even more clearly 
pretextual. 
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pretextual (R. 25). The trial court found that Officer Hedenstrom's 
stop of Mr. Velasquez was not a pretext but a proper stop: 
Section 41-1-43, Utah Code Ann., requires 
the issuance of "two identical registration 
plates" for every motor vehicle other than a 
motorcycle, trailer, etc. The said Section 
further provides that the plates so issued may 
not be removed from the vehicle or used upon any 
other vehicle. 
Section 41-1-48, Utah Code Ann., requires 
that every motor vehicle, except a motorcycle, 
trailer, etc., shall have attached to the front 
of the vehicle one license plate, and the other 
license plate to the rear. 
The automobile driven by the defendant at 
the time of the stop had different license plates 
attached to the front and rear of the car. 
Therefore, operation of such car would be in 
violation of the law. The officer had a right, 
and a duty, to stop this motor vehicle because of 
this violation of law. Therefore, the stopping 
of this vehicle was a valid stop. 
(R. 29-30, in Appendix 2). 
As noted in State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), 
the mere fact that a traffic violation has occurred does not 
insulate a stop from scrutiny. See id. at 977-979. Inasmuch as the 
trial court apparently did not consider the possibility of a 
pretextual stop in this case after identifying a traffic violation, 
the court's ruling contains an error of law that should be corrected 
by this Court. 
2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT A HYPOTHETICAL REASONABLE OFFICER WOULD 
HAVE STOPPED MR. VELASQUEZ'S CAR. 
In State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), this 
Court explained the relevant inquiry when the allegation of a 
pretext stop is raised: 
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In determining whether a stop for a traffic 
violation and subsequent arrest is a pretext, the 
totality of the circumstances governs. In making 
this determination the subjective intent of the 
officer is irrelevant. "Whether a Fourth 
Amendment violation has occurred 'turns on an 
objective assessment of the officer's actions in 
light of the facts and circumstances confronting 
him at the time,' and not on the officer's actual 
state of mind at the time the challenged action 
was taken." Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 105 
S.Ct. 2778, 2783, 86 L.Ed. 2d 370 (1985)(quoting 
Scott v. United States. 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978)). 
.... 
Thus, in determining whether [a stop] was an 
unconstitutional pretext, we focus on whether a 
hypothetical reasonable officer, in view of the 
totality of the circumstances confronting him or 
her, would have stopped [the defendant] to issue 
a warning[.] 
Id. at 977-978 (citations omitted, emphasis by the Court). 
In applying the hypothetical reasonable officer standard, 
this Court generally refers to the record of the officer in question 
and other police officers to determine if the traffic stop is one 
that is routinely performed. See State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 155 
and n. 2 (Utah App. 1989)(noting that the officer in question and 
other officers do not frequently stop cars for the violation in 
question); State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah App. 1989) ("We 
agree with the trial judge that this is the type of clear cut 
traffic violation for which officers routinely stop citizens and 
issue citations."). 
The State presented no evidence indicating that Officer 
Hedenstrom routinely stops vehicles for mismatched license plates. 
Officer Hedenstrom's failure to investigate the mismatched plates 
when he noticed them earlier as Mr. Velasquez's car was being parked 
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on State Street demonstrates that investigation of mismatched plates 
is not routine procedure for Officer Hedenstrom. Further, Officer 
Hedenstrom never cited Mr. Velasquez for the improper plates. The 
State presented no evidence or judicial precedents recognizing that 
other officers routinely stop cars for mismatched license plates. 
Had the trial court applied the hypothetical reasonable 
officer test, it appears the Officer Hedenstrom's stop would have 
been found pretextual. 
B. THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH WAS IMPROPER. 
Searches conducted "outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions." The burden of establishing the 
existence of one of the exceptions to the warrant 
requirement is on the prosecution. 
State v. Arrovo. 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 15 (Utah 1990). 
1. THE SEARCH WAS NOT INCIDENT TO ARREST. 
While neither the prosecutor nor the trial court relied on 
the "search incident to arrest" theory to justify the search in this 
case, because Officer Hedenstrom7s testimony could be interpreted as 
asserting that theory as a justification for the search, see T. 10 
and footnote 4 of this brief, Mr. Velasquez will briefly address the 
inapplicability of that theory in this case. 
In making a valid arrest, a police officer is entitled to 
conduct a warrantless search for weapons and evidence. New York v. 
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Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). The physical scope of the search 
incident to arrest is limited, however, to the arrestee, and to the 
arrestee's area of physical control. See Chimel v. California, 395 
U.S. 752, 763 (1969)(arrestee's area of immediate control is "the 
area from within which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a 
weapon or destructible evidence."). 
Officer Hedenstrom indicated that when he began the 
search of Mr. Velasquez's car, Mr. Velasquez was secured in Officer 
Mosier's car with Officer Mosier (T. 8). Because the search went 
beyond Mr. Velasquez's area of immediate control, the search cannot 
be justified as a search incident to arrest. 
2. THE IMPOUND WAS IMPROPER. 
The trial court found that the impound of the car was 
proper, stating, "The impounding of the vehicle was justified since 
the defendant was alone and the vehicle could not be left on the 
streets." (R. 31, in appendix 2). 
In State v. Hycrh. 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court indicated that car impounds do not automatically 
follow arrests of car drivers: 
In order to support a finding that a valid 
inventory search has taken place, the court must 
first determine whether there was reasonable and 
proper justification for the impoundment of the 
vehicle. This justification, and thus lawful 
impoundment, can be had either through explicit 
statutory authorization or by the circumstances 
surrounding the initial stop. If impoundment was 
neither authorized nor necessary, the search was 
unreasonable. 
Id. at 268. 
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a. THERE WAS NO STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR THE IMPOUND. 
Utah Code Ann. section 41-1-115 allows for impounding 
vehicles in the following circumstances: 
(1) The department or any peace officer, without 
a warrant, may seize and take possession of any 
vehicle: 
(a) which is being operated with improper 
registration; 
(b) which the department or the peace 
officer has reason to believe has been 
stolen; 
(c) on which any motor number, 
manufacturer's number, vehicle 
identification number, or identification 
mark has been defaced, altered, or 
obliterated; 
(d) which has been abandoned on public 
highways; 
(e) for which the registration or title fees 
have not been paid; or 
(f) for which the applicant has written a 
check for registration or title fees which 
has not been honored by the applicant's bank 
and which is not paid within 30 days. 
(2) Any peace officer seizing or taking 
possession of a vehicle under this section shall 
immediately notify the department of the action 
and shall hold the vehicle until notified by the 
department as to further action that should be 
taken regarding the disposition of the vehicle. 
While it might appear that perhaps Mr. Velasquez's car was 
subject to impound under subsection (a) relating to improperly 
registered vehicles, his mismatched license plates were merely 
improper indicia of registration. See Utah Code Ann. section 
41-1-43 (indicating that the issuance of license plates occurs 
"upon" registration). While the indicia of registration of 
Mr. Velasquez's car was improper, there was no evidence that 
Mr. Velasquez's car was actually registered improperly (T. 11-12). 
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Further, neither the trial court nor Officer Hedenstrom 
relied on the statute, and there was no testimony that Officer 
Hedenstrom complied with subsection (2) of the impound statute, 
requiring him to call the department immediately for directions on 
the further actions to be taken. 
b. THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT JUSTIFY THE IMPOUND. 
In Hyah, after determining that no statutory authorization 
justified the impound in that case, the court went to the second 
step of the inquiry, to determine whether the circumstances 
surrounding the stop justified the impound. 711 P.2d at 268. The 
court first noted, "[i]t is the burden of the State to establish the 
necessity for the taking and the inventory of the vehicle." 711 
P.2d at 268. The court found that the written police department 
impound policy presented to the trial court in that case was not 
followed, and that the State failed to meet its burden of justifying 
the impound of the car. Id. at 269. 
The State did not present the departmental policy on 
impounding cars relied on by Salt Lake City Police Officer 
Hedenstrom in this case. Assuming that the same Salt Lake City 
policy in effect in Hyqh is still the current policy, there was no 
testimony indicating that Officer Hedenstrom complied with it. See 
Hyqh at 268-269 (the Salt Lake City impound and inventory policy in 
effect at the time of the Hyqh decision required the police officer 
to allow for release of the vehicle to a third person, ask the owner 
of the car if there are valuables in the car, inform the owner of 
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the car of the procedures to be followed to insure the safety of the 
car and its contents, record all items inventoried, and give items 
in the car to the owner, or store them in the trunk or in evidence 
for their protection). 
Comparison of the facts in this case and those in other 
cases evaluating the circumstances surrounding car impounds shows 
further that the State failed to justify the impound in this case. 
See State v, Ricer 717 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 1986)(per curiam)("Cache 
County has no written standards ... for ... impoundment... It is 
undisputed that defendants truck was safely locked and parked in a 
parking lot behind a law office. There is no evidence that there 
the vehicle posed any danger to the officers or the public. 
Defendant was not permitted to have someone pick up his locked truck 
from the parking lot or to arrange other disposition. Defendant was 
neither advised of the search in advance nor allowed an opportunity 
to be present."); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 373-374 (1987)(after 
noting that police could have allowed the defendant to dispose of 
his car, rather than impounding and inventorying it, the Court 
concluded that "reasonable police regulations relating to inventory 
procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth 
Amendmentf
 m J") m But cf. State v. Johnson. 745 P.2d 452,, 453-454 
(Utah 1987)("At the time of the arrests, Johnson's car was parked in 
the middle of a motel parking lot, blocking traffic. The car had an 
out-of-town temporary sticker in lieu of license plates. Johnson 
did not have a driver's license, and his friends were under the 
influence of a controlled substance and were under arrest; neither 
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Johnson nor his friends could properly have moved the vehicle." It 
is unclear whether the policy the police were operating under 
encompassed impounds as well as inventories: "Johnson/s car was 
impounded and an inventory search was conducted in compliance with 
the Los Angeles Police Department automobile inventory checklist."). 
3. THE SEARCH WAS NOT A PROPER INVENTORY SEARCH. 
In finding that the inventory search in this case was 
proper, the trial court quoted South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 
364 (1976): 
Police authorities are justified in making an 
inventory of such vehicles at the time of 
impounding. As stated in South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 49 L.Ed.2d 100 (1976): 
When vehicles are impounded, local police 
departments generally follow a routine 
practice of securing and inventorying the 
automobile's contents. These procedures 
developed in response to three distinct 
needs: the protection of the owner's 
property while in [sic] remains in police 
custody... the protection of the police 
against claims or disputes over lost or 
stolen property... and the protection of the 
police from potential danger.... The 
practice has been viewed as essential to 
respond to incidents of theft or vandalism. 
The above court went on to state that such 
caretaking procedures have been uniformly upheld 
by state courts throughout the various 
jurisdictions, and that the majority of the 
federal courts of appeals have likewise 
"sustained inventory procedures as reasonable 
police intrusions.".... 
(R. 31, in Appendix 2). 
While the trial court's quotation of Opperman was 
essentially correct, the trial court's analysis was incomplete. 
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a. THE STATE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE EXISTENCE OF INVENTORY 
POLICIES AND COMPLIANCE THEREWITH. 
As the Court explained in Hyqh, to justify a warrantless 
search as an inventory search, the State must present "established 
reasonable procedures" governing inventory searches and proof that 
inventory searches are conducted in conformity with those 
procedures. 711 P.2d at 269, quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364 (1983). 
Recently, the United States Supreme Court has extended the 
rationale of Opperman, indicating that if an officer opens a closed 
container during an inventory search, the State must demonstrate 
that the policy governing the inventory search gave specific 
direction concerning the treatment of closed containers. Florida v. 
Wellsr 495 U.S. , 109 L.Ed.2d 1, 110 S.Ct. (1990). Accord 
State v. Shamblin. 763 P.2d 425, 427-428 (Utah App. 1988). 
The State did not present any inventory policy limiting 
Officer Hedenstrom's discretion in searching Mr. Velasquez's car or 
the containers in the car. While Officer Hedenstrom intimated that 
an inventory sheet was filled out during the search of 
Mr. Velasquez's car, none was presented by the State (T. 11, 14). 
See footnote 5, supra. 
b. THE SEARCH WAS PRETEXTUAL. 
In Hyah, after noting that the State had failed to meet its 
burden of demonstrating that the warrantless search of Mr. Hygh's 
car was an inventory search, the Court found that the search was not 
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an inventory search, but was pretextual. Apparently examining the 
officer7s subjective intent during the inventory, the Court stated, 
In addition, Officer Foster sent another officer 
to the police station to retrieve the picture of 
the robbery suspect even before asking defendant 
for his license and registration, waited for the 
picture before beginning the search, and searched 
with the picture in his hand. These facts 
indicate that the "inventory" search was merely a 
pretext for a warrantless search. 
Id. at 270. 
The court explained the impropriety of pretextual 
"inventory" searches, as follows: 
Because inventories promote such important 
interests and are not investigatory in purpose, 
they do not implicate "the interests which are 
protected when searches are conditioned on 
warrants." Therefore, inventory searches are not 
per se unreasonable within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment and article I, section 14. 
Contraband or other evidence of crime discovered 
in a true inventory search may be seized without 
a warrant and introduced into evidence at trial. 
However, the inventory exception does not apply 
when the inventory is merely "a pretext 
concealing an investigatory police motive." 
Fundamental constitutional guarantees against 
unreasonable searches cannot be evaded by 
labeling them "inventory" searches. 
711 P.2d at 267-268. 
The fact that the "inventory" search in the instant case 
was a pretext facilitating an investigatory police motive is 
demonstrated through reference to Officer Hedenstrom's testimony: 
Q What is the policy of your department 
regarding vehicle impounds in these situations? 
A The vehicles are searched prior to the 
impound for valuables and any evidence. 
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(T. 6)(emphasis added). As explained in Hygh, warrantless searches 
are justified as inventory searches only if they are truly inventory 
searches, rather that pretend inventory searches masking 
investigatory motives. 711 P.2d at 268. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's order denying 
Mr. Velasquez's motion to suppress and reverse his conviction. 
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APPENDIX 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
TEXT OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, § 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance 
of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
APPENDIX 2 
TRIAL COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Thfro Jiiv-Vc: '/iilrut 
MAR 2 1 1990 
S A L T L A ^ C J V , / 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARIO JOSE VELASQUEZ, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
CIVIL NO. 901900313 FS 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress came on for hearing on March 
20, 1990. The defendant was present with counsel and 
interpreter, and the State was represented by its counsel. 
Evidence was received, the case argued, and authorities relied 
upon presented by both counsel. The Court took the matter 
under advisement. 
The Court now rules as follows. 
The only witness, the arresting officer, testified that the 
motor vehicle driven by the defendant had different license 
plates on the front and rear, therefore, he pulled it over. 
The driver could not produce a driver's license. He did 
produce a prior traffic citation wherein he had been cited for 
having no driver's license. During this stop, the defendant 
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gave different names to the officer. No evidence was offered 
as to whether or not there was a registration card in the 
vehicle. 
Based upon the above, the officer arrested the defendant. 
Since he was alone, the automobile was impounded. Following 
police department procedures, an inventory was made of the 
automobile wherein a cash box was found on the floor by the 
driver's seat containing a substance believed to be a 
controlled substance, and paraphernalia in relationship to the 
same. Defendant was booked for driving without a driver's 
license, giving false information to the police officer, and 
possession of a controlled substance. 
Defendant argues that the stop was a pretext to 
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and, 
therefore, the fruits of such illegal search should be 
suppressed. 
The State argues that the stop was not a pretext for a 
search, but for violation of the law in the presence of the 
officer. The search that occurred was an inventory search in 
relationship to impounding the vehicle. 
Section 41-1-43, Utah Code Ann., requires the issuance of 
"two identical registration plates" for every motor vehicle 
coo 
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other than a motorcycle, trailer, etc. The said Section 
further provides that the plates so issued may not be removed 
from the vehicle or used upon any other vehicle. 
Section 41-1-48, Utah Code Ann., requires that every motor 
vehicle, except a motorcycle, trailer, etc., shall have 
attached to the front of the vehicle one license plate, and the 
other license plate to the rear. 
The automobile driven by the defendant at the time of the 
stop had different license plates attached to the front and 
rear of the car. Therefore, operation of such car would be in 
violation of the law. The officer had a right, and a duty, to 
stop this motor vehicle because of this violation of law. 
Therefore, the stopping of this vehicle was a valid stop. 
Upon further inquiry, the driver of the automobile could 
not produce a driver's license, but did produce a prior 
citation indicating he had previously been arrested for driving 
without a license. He also gave the officer different names. 
Based upon all of the above, the officer was justified in 
arresting the defendant and booking him. The stopping of this 
vehicle was not a mere pretext to searching of the automobile. 
The stop was made for violation of the law in the presence of 
the officer. The subsequent arrest and booking were justified 
under the totality of the circumstances. 
coo 
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The impounding of the vehicle was justified since the 
defendant was alone and the vehicle could not be left on the 
streets. Police authorities are justified in making an 
inventory of such vehicles at the time of impounding. As 
stated in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 49 L.Ed.2d 
1000 (1976): 
When vehicles are impounded, local police 
departments generally follow a routine 
practice of securing and inventorying the 
automobile's contents. These procedures 
developed in response to three distinct 
needs: the protection of the owner's 
property while in remains in police 
custody... the protection of the police 
against claims or disputes over lost or 
stolen property— and the protection of the 
police from potential danger The 
practice has been viewed as essential to 
respond to incidents of theft or vandalism. 
The above court went on to state that such caretaking 
procedures have been uniformly upheld by state courts 
throughout the various jurisdictions, and that the majority of 
the federal courts of appeals have likewise "sustained 
inventory procedures as reasonable police intrusions." The 
United States Supreme Court upheld the police inventory of an 
impounded vehicle under the facts of that case. 
r\n<\'~>^ 
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We hold that the stop was valid, as was the arrest, and 
that the inventory by the police authorities of the automobile 
in this case was justified because the car was being 
impounded. The inventory was justified for the reasons stated 
above. The discovery of the suspected evidence was made during 
a legal search of this vehicle. 
Based upon the above, defendant's Motion to Suppress the 
evidence taken during the inventory search is denied. 
Dated this/C*/ day of March, 1990. 
LEONARD H. RUSSON 
.STRICT COURT JUDGE 
\ 
GGG33 
STATE V. VELASQUEZ PAGE SIX RULING ON MOTION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Ruling on Motion to Suppress, to the 
following, this _f^f£day of March, 1990: 
James M. Cope 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James A. Valdez 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
^3>^zz7v *•?!*-<•* «=> ^ w ^ _ y 
orv'Vll 
APPENDIX 3 
"BURKOFF ARTICLE" 
(Burkoff, "The Pretext Search 
Doctrine Returns After Never Leaving," 
66 U. Detroit L.Rev. 363 (1989)) 
The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns 
After Never Leaving 
JOHN M BURKOFF* 
DEDICATION 
This Article is dedicated to the memory of G Mennen Williams 
I was Justice Williams' law clerk from 1973 to 1975 Not only 
did I come to admire and to respect him, but my wife, Nancy, and I 
grew to love him Justice Williams and his wife, Nancy, treated us 
like family 
I arrived for my clerkship in May of 1973 Like many, if not 
most, newly-minted Michigan Law School graduates, I was cocky, 
self-satisfied, and smug I thought I knew it all How quickly I 
learned otherwise If for that alone, I had Justice Williams to thank 
for my brief (if evanescent) exposure to humility 
But he truly taught me so much more He taught me about law 
and lawyers (and life) in a way that cold reported decisions, musty 
casebooks, and my Michigan Law School professors did not—and 
could not Justice Williams taught me by example He neither lec-
tured nor hectored me He showed me He snowed me patience 
He showed me how to exercise the public trust responsibly He 
showed me tolerance He showed me love He showed me how not 
to become distracted from the constant struggle to search for the 
truth in the law 
This Article is about truth It is about the importance of recog-
nizing that constitutional doctrine must be crafted in such a way that 
it beatifies the truth, rather than ignoring it for short-term, result-
oriented reasons, however instantly appealing It will come as no 
surprise to those who knew us both, that as close as Justice Williams 
and I became, we did not agree on everything (Sometimes, he was 
wrong ) But I know that, whether or not he would have agreed with 
my conclusions in this Article— and we would have had some lively 
discussions about those conclusions—he would have encouraged 
and applauded my attempt to preserve the truth. 
Rest in peace, Governor We miss you 
* Professor of Law, University <J Pittsburgh A B 1970, J D 1973, Univer-
sity of Michigan LL M 1976, Harvard University The author gratefulh acknowl-
edges the research assistance of Barbara Moravitz, Class of 1989 
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Ok, what a tangled web we weave, 
When first we practice to deceive!** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Chief Justice (then-Justice) Rehnquist once candidly observed 
that "the decisions of this Court dealing with the constitutionality of 
warrantless searches . . . suggest that this branch of the law is some-
thing less than a seamless web."1 There are, however, few fourth 
amendment webs less seamless—more tangled—than the decisional 
law and underlying doctrine relating to pretextual fourth amend-
ment activity. 
By "pretextual fourth amendment activity,'* I am referring to 
searches or sei/uies (including arrests) that are undertaken by law 
enforcement officers for reasons that do not constitute a proper 
legal justification for such activity.2 Such conduct is commonh 
called a "pretext," a "sham," or a "subterfuge,*' but the common 
thread is that it can be established that it was undertaken for illegiti-
mate reasons. Although it might seem to the reader who is first en-
countering this branch of the law a bit strange, if not wholly 
perverse, to be informed that some commentators and judges con-
sider such unjustified (by definition) fourth amendment activity to 
be nonetheless constitutional under the fourth amendment, that is 
indeed the case.3 Under this view of fourth amendment pretext 
doctrine, no cognizable constitutional problem exists when the 
problematic activity of law enforcement officers can be described as 
if it was within the boundaries of the law, although it can otherwise 
be conclusively demonstrated that such a rationalized justification is 
a fiction, i.e., that it does not in fact reflect the officers' true reasons 
for so acting. 
This author most assuredly does not share the point of view that 
the Constitution, current fourth amendment cases, or fourth 
amendment doctrine countenance or command legitimizing such a 
fiction.4 Most federal and state court judges, likewise, do not share 
the point of view that pretexts are constitutionally irrelevant.5 
** Scott, Marmion, introduction, canto VI, stanza 17 (1808). 
4
*I will not practice to deceive,/ Yet, to avoid deceit, I mean to learn." Shake-
speare, King John, act I, sc. 1, lines 214-15. 
1. Cad> v. Dombrowski, 413 U S. 433, 440 (1973). 
2. See Burkoflf, Bad Faith Searches, 47 N Y.U. L. Rtv. 70, 71 n.5, 101 n.160 
(1982) [hereinafter Burkoff. Bad Faith Searches]. 
3 See in/ta text accompanying notes 62-85, 102, 121. Since such commenta-
tors and judges have found the activity so described not to be constitutionally ob-
jectionable, the\ have accordingly found such cases to be inappropriate for 
application of the exclusionary rule 
4. See mfa text accompanying notes 39-45 
5. See mfta note 56 and text accompanying note 124. 
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The Supreme Court had a golden opportunity during its 1986-
1987 Term to make clear what its position actually is with respect to 
ihe constitutionality of pretexts. Questions relating to the appropri-
ate constitutional significance of fourth amendment pretextual activ-
it\ were squarely before the Court in the case of Missouri v. Blair.6 
Certiorari was granted, briefs were filed, oral argument was heard; 
months passed while the parties waited for the Court's decision and, 
ultimately, the Court decided not to decide; it dismissed the writ of 
ceitiorari as improvidently granted without a single word of 
explanation. 
It is truly unfortunate that the Blair case was not decided by the 
Supreme Court. The facts in Blair posed pretext conundra in a 
tlear-cut fashion.7 Nonetheless, the argument in Blair may well have 
had a significant effect on the Court. In four other important cases 
decided after Blair was argued to the Court, the Supreme Court 
handed down decisions where fourth amendment doctrine relating 
to pretextual activity was also applied or discussed.8 These four 
cases—cases which reflect the Court's views on all of the important 
legal points relating to pretexts that were argued but not decided in 
Blair—make clear what has all too often not been clear to some 
judges and commentators during the past decade, namely that: 
(I) the Supreme Court recognizes that a rinding of unconstitutional-
ity is compelled where evidence is seized on the basis of pretextual 
fourth amendment activity; (2) the Supreme Court recognizes that 
pretexts exist when law enforcement officers actually act pretextu-
ally even when they could have acted lawfully (but in fact did not); 
and, (3) the Supreme Court recognizes that the improper motiva-
tion of searching or arresting law enforcement officers—their "bad 
faith" or the absence thereof—is relevant to fourth amendment pre-
text analysis. 
This Article expands upon these points. It also makes the case 
for the continuing recognition and application of a vital, nonfictive 
pretext search doctrine. This approach to fourth amendment deci-
sion-making will **insure[] that every time a defendant can demon-
strate a pretext search or arrest, a court will deal with the pretextual 
activity under the law, and not simply ignore it."9 
6. State v. Blair. 691 S.W 2d 259 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), cert granted sub nom 
Missouri v. Blair, 474 VS. 1049 (1986), cert dismissed, 480 U.S 689 (1987). 
7. For a discussion of the Blair case, see in/ta text accompanying notes 86-143. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 144-204. 
9. Burkoff, Rejoinder Truth, Justice, and the -tmencan \\'a\—Or Professor Haddads 
Haid Choices: 18 U MICH J L. RLF. 695, 703 (1985) [hereinafter BurkoH, Rejoinder) 
{footnote omitted). 
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II. THE PRETEXT SEARCH DOCTRINE CONTROVERSY 
A. Scott and Its Progeny 
In 1978, the Supreme Court decided what has, however inap-
propriately, become the seminal case on pretexts: Scott v. United 
States.10 In Scott, then-Justice Rehnquist offhandedly observed for a 
majority of the Court that (he issue whether a fourth amendment 
violation exists in a given case of questioned law enforcement search 
or seizure activity should be resolved exclusively by using, in his 
words, 4ta standard of objective reasonableness without regard to 
the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved."11 Such 
an objective test is appropriate, Rehnquist opined, because "the fact 
that the officer docs not have the state of mind which is hypothe-
cated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the of-
ficer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the 
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action."12 
Justice Rehnquist did not explain why this remarkable proposi-
tion—that law enforcement officers' intent or motivation is irrele-
vant—should be the case or why application of such an "objective" 
test was deemed to be compelled, necessary, or even desirable, as a 
test for fourth amendment analysis. The Scott "objective" test lan-
guage simply appeared as ifdeus ex machina. Indeed, \k is questiona-
ble, to put it mildly, whether the handful of prior Supreme Court 
decisions expressly relied upon by Justice Rehnquist to support his 
application of an "objective test" actually stood for the supportive 
propositions for which they were cited as precedential authority.13 
As Professor Wayne LaFave commented in analyzing this authority, 
"Justice Rehnquist is certainly correct in stating [in Scott] that the 
Court has 'not examined this exact question at great length in any of 
our prior opinions,' but it may nonetheless be fairly said that he has 
presented a somewhat skewed picture of what the Court had had to 
say on this subject."14 Just as important, Rehnquist failed to men-
tion, let alone discuss, any of a number of prior Supreme Court 
opinions that had treated law enforcement officers' improper mo-
tives for engaging in search or seizure activity as not only relevant 
but, in some cases, dispositive of the question of the conduct's 
fourth amendment constitutionality.15 
10. 436 U.S. 128 (1978). 
11. Id. at 138 (footnote omitted). 
12. Id. 
13. For criticism of Justice Rehnquist's use of this precedent, see Burkoff, Bad 
Faith Searches, supta note 2, at 75-76 n.22. 
14. W. K\FAVE, SFAKC.II AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
§ 1.4(a). at 82 (2d eel. 1987). 
15. See, f # . South Dakota v. Oppetman, 428 U.S. 364. 376 (1976); Brown v. 
Illinois. 422 VS. 590. 611 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Wainwriglu v. Cit> of 
New Orleans. 392 U.S. 598. 606-07* (1968) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Abel v. 
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Nonetheless, whatever the legitimacy of its parentage, there is 
no denying the fact that the Supreme Court ruled in Scott that analy-
sis of fourth amendment issues should be conducted "objectively." 
The question then arises: what does this mean with respect to pre-
texts? If, indeed, the constitutionality of all fourth amendment ac-
tivity must be evaluated exclusively "objectively/' i.e., in the Scott 
Court's words, "without regard to the underlying intent or motiva-
tion of the officers involved," it is problematic whether pretextual 
fourth amendment activity can ever be proved. How do you demon-
strate a "pretext" "objectively?" More to the point, the question 
arises whether such pretexts are indeed unconstitutional in any 
event.10 From this perspective, the putative use of an objective test 
for fourth amendment analysis and the law relating to pretexts are 
directly and inextricably related. As I have elaborated upon else-
where,'7 if evidence of a searching or arresting officer's pretextual 
motives is treated as irrelevant and, hence, inadmissible at suppres-
sion hearings (when it is otherwise available), it will be almost im-
possible to prove the officer's lack of lawful justification to search or 
arrest where, as is common, "the state is able to contrive an appro-
priate legal justification to account for the appearance (but not the 
reality) of a questioned search."18 
It is possible to avoid reaching this unhappy (to me) conclusion 
by recognizing that the Scott Court simply did not—or at least did 
not mean to—apply its supposed objective test to the issue of 
pretextual fourth amendment activity. After all, the objective test 
language in Scott was obiter dictum. The Scott case focused upon the 
constitutionality of the conduct of FBI agents who monitored a 
court-approved wiretap. The authorizing court order relied upon 
by the agents specifically required that the interception of conversa-
tions be "minimized" so as to include only those conversations law-
t'nited States, 362 U.S. 217. 226. 230 (1960); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 
500 (1958) (Clark, J., dissenting); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United States v. Lefltowitz, 285 V.S. 452, 467 
(1932). See also United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276 n.4 (1978). See the 
discussion of these cases in BurkofF, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 75-81; W. 
LAFAVE, supra note 14, at § 1.4. 
16. For the position that they are not unconstitutional, see Haddad, Pretextual 
Fourth Amendment Activity; Another Viewpoint, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 639 (1985). See 
infra text accompanying notes 62-85 for a discussion of Haddad's position. 
17. See Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Xow You See It, Xow You Don't, 17 U. 
MICH. J. L. REF. 523, 525-26 (1984) [hereinafter Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine); 
Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 81-82; Burkoff, The Court That Devoured the 
Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REV. 
151, 190 (1979) [hereinafter Burkoff, Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine). 
18. Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 17, ai 548. 
19. I have argued just this point. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 
83-84,98-100. 
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fully subject to interception under the federal wiretap statute* 
The FBI agents did not, however, use any selectivity in their inter 
ception of conversations; instead, they simply recorded every single 
call made over the subject telephone during the interception period 
including personal calls, calls concerning employment opportuni-
ties, and calls to the weather service.21 
Defendant Scott claimed that this absence of minimization wa* 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the consti-
tutionality of this activity despite the absence of apparent minimiza-
tion because the agents never reached the point where it ua> 
necessary to minimize their interception of calls: 
In a case such as this, involving a wide-ranging conspiracy 
with a large number of participants, even a seasoned lis-
tener would have been hard pressed to determine with any 
precision the relevancy of many of the calls before they 
were completed. A large number were ambiguous in na-
ture, making characterization virtually impossible until the 
completion of these calls. And some of the nonpertinent 
conversations were one-time conversations. Since these calls 
did not give the agents an opportunity to develop a category of inno-
cent calls which should not have been intercepted, their interception 
cannot be viewed as a violation of the minimization requirements.22 
In essence, the FBI agents in Scott never had the opportunity to 
act upon their arguable intent to act in bad faith—to ignore the min-
imization requirement—since none of the calls actually intercepted 
were "non-interceptible" under the Supreme Court's reading of the 
law. Hence, the language in Scott about "objective reasonableness" 
and "underlying intent or motivation** is simply unnecessary to the 
decision. The Scott Court "merely held that improper intent that is 
not acted upon does not render unconstitutional an otherwise consti-
tutional search. Since in pretext cases the searching officer has b\ 
definition acted on his unlawful intent, this reading of Scott harmo-
nizes the case with the Court's continuing concern about 
pretexts."-'* 
20. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 130 (1978). 
21. United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233, 247 (D.D.C. 1971). "(Tjhe moni-
toring agents made no attempt to comply with the minimization order of the Court 
but listened to and recorded all tails over the Isubjectl telephone. They showed no 
regard for the right of privacv and did nothing to avoid unnecessary intmsion." 
Scott v. United States, Nos. 74-2097. 74-2098 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1974) quoted in Scott 
v. United States, 436 IS. 128, 144 (1978) (Brennan.J., dissenting) (bracketed ma-
terial in original). 
22. 43b V.S at 142 (footnote omitted, emphasis added) 
23. lltiikoff, fiad tuutti Seanfw. supra note 2, at 83-84 (footnotes omitted, em-
phasis added). See also Btnkolf, Pretest Smith Doctrine, supra note 17, at 525-27; Note, 
Addressing the Pretext Problem- The Role of Subjective Motivation m Establishing Fourth 
Amendment flotations, 63 B.U.L. REV. 223, 241 (i983). 
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As convenient as this obiter dictum conclusion is for those of us 
who would like to reconcile the Scott objective test language with 
prior (and subsequent) Supreme Court decisional law stating or im-
plying that pretextual searches and arrests are unconstitutional,24 
the Supreme Court subsequently applied Scott as if it were not obiter 
dictum in its 1983 decision in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez25 
The Villamonte-Marquez case involved the suspicionless boarding of a 
vessel, the Henry Morgan II, by customs officers. Then-Justice Rehn-
quist, the author of the Scott majority opinion, concluded for the ma-
jority in Villamonte-Marquez that such random, suspicionless stops 
and boardings of vessels "with ready access to the open sea** are 
constitutional despite the absence of particularized antecedent justi-
fication, at least when they are made by federal agents armed with 
the statutory authority to enforce federal vessel documentation 
laws.'6 The defendants in Villamonte-Marquez, all of whom were ulti-
mately convicted of various narcotics offenses after the boarding of-
ficers discovered marijuana aboard the Henry Morgan II', argued that 
the search of their ship was pretextual, and that it was not in fact 
made to enforce the vessel documentation laws whose existence 
gave rise to the legal and constitutional authority to search without 
any antecedent justification. Rather, defendants flatly contended, 
,4[t]he Henry Morgan II was boarded by the officers of a law enforce-
ment patrol formed for the specific criminal investigatory purpose 
of locating boats loaded with marijuana.,**r7 
There was, moreover, a good deal of evidence on the record 
before the Supreme Court establishing that defendants' pretext ar-
gument had some merit to it. Not the least of the evidence mar-
shalled by defendants was the fact that a state police narcotics 
investigator who boarded the Henry Morgan II with the federal cus-
toms agents conceded the truth of defendants' claim, that the officers 
were boarding all of the ships at anchor in the ship channel looking 
for narcotics 2H Justice Rehnquist was not, however, interested in the 
merit—-or lack thereof—of this contention. Rather, he summarily 
rejected the pretext argument itself as untenable, ruling in a cursory 
footnote that: 
Respondents . . . contend . . . that because the customs of-
24. See, eg , United States v. ^efkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1921) ("An arrest 
may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence."); cases cited in supra note 14 
and infra notes 144-204. 
25. 462 U.S. 579 (1983). 
26. I criticized this conclusion as a matter of fourth amendment doctrine with-
out regard to the pretext issue in Burkoff, When Is A Search Xot A 'Search?' Fourth 
Amendment Doublethink, 15 U. loi.. I.. RKV. 515, 541-46 (1984). 
27. Brief for the Respondents at 6, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 
U.S. 579 (1983). 
28. Id. ai 9. See also Burkoflf, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 17, at 530-32. 
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ficers were accompanied by a Louisiana state policeman, 
and were following an informant's tip that a vessel in the 
ship channel was thought to be carrying marijuana, they 
may not rely on the statute authorizing boarding for in-
spection of the vessel's documentation. This line of rea-
soning was rejected in a similar situation in Scott v United 
States . . ., and we again reject it.2<J 
In other words, a majority of the Villamonte-Marquez Court held 
that because the Scott decision dictated the use of an objective test to 
gauge the validity of fourth amendment activity, the admittedly un-
lawful30 (subjective) motive of the boarding officers in Villamonte-
Maiquez to undertake a pretextual search was simply irrelevant to 
the constitutional analysis because a document search of the vessel 
could have lawfully been made under federal regulations. Applied in 
this manner, the Scott language made it totally impossible for the 
Villamonte-Marquez defendants to present a cognizable case of pre-
text, as the true reasons the vessel search was undertaken were 
treated as wholly irrelevant—the truth was less important to the 
Court than the fictive objective appearance of the activity as it could 
have been interpreted when viewed in the most charitable, if inaccu-
rate, possible light.31 
Professor LaFave has noted that the Supreme^Court has also 
relied upon Scott in one case besides Villamonte-Marquez?2 the 1985 
decision of Maryland v. Macon.35 This is nominally true since the 
Scott decision was cited in Macon, but Macon is not a case that deals 
with pretext issues. In Macon, the Supreme Court ruled that a plain-
clothes, undercover detective who purchased two obscene 
magazines with a marked fifty dollar bill, left the store and then im-
mediately returned to retrieve the bill (without, it might be pointed 
out for the record, returning the change for the fifty dollars he had 
previously received) was not subject to any fourth amendment re-
strictions on his conduct* as he had not "seized" the magazines 
within the meaning of the term "seizure" in the fourth amendment 
The reason there was no "seizure," Justice O'Connor stated for the 
29 462 U S at 584 n 3 (citation omitted) 
30 Normally, fourth amendment activity must be supported by probable 
cause New Jersey v I\L O . 469 U S 325, 342 (1985). Hence, a search for man-
juana ordinal ily would require the existence of probable cause which, as the 
Supreme Court acknowledged, did not exist in the Villamonte-Marquez case The 
parties further agreed that not even the lesser antecedent justification of "reason-
able suspicion" existed as justification for the search of the Henry Morgan II 
31. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist ignored even the questionable objective appear-
ance of this acti\n\ I he record was replete with objective evidence of pretext, 
whollv aside from the Louisiana state policeman's subjective concession of pretext 
See Buikofi, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 17, at 530-32. 
32 W IW\FAVL, supra note 14, § 1 4, at 81 n.2 
33 472 U S 463 (1985) 
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majority, was that the seller had "voluntarily transferred any posses-
sory interest he may have had in the magazines to the purchaser 
upon the receipt of the funds."34 Defendant Macon argued, how-
ever, that this transfer of funds was not what it appeared to be, i.e., it 
was not really a bona fide commercial transaction. The undercover 
agent clearly neither intended—nor permitted—the buyer to keep 
the fifty dollars he had tendered; hence, defendant urged, the 
agent's act of obtaining the magazines at issue should be treated not 
as a purchase, but as an involuntary "seizure" that must be justified 
under the fourth amendment.35 The Macon majority disagreed with 
this contention, ruling in response that: 
This argument cannot withstand scrutiny. Whether a 
Fourth Amendment violation has occurred "turns on an 
objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the 
facts and circumstances confronting him at the time," Scott 
v. United States, . . . and not on the officer's actual state of 
mind at the time the challenged action was taken. . . . Ob-
jectively viewed, the transaction was a sale in the ordinary 
course of business. The sale is not retrospectively trans-
formed into a warrantless seizure by virtue of the officer's 
subjective intent to retrieve the purchase money to use as 
evidence.36 
As in Villamonte-Marquez, the Scott language was used by the Ma-
con Court to render the true reasons why the conduct in question 
took place (criminal investigation not ordinary commercial 
34 Id. at 469 
35 Brief for the Respondent at 10-11, Maryland v. Macon, 472 US 463 
(1985). Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union made the argument most 
clearly: 
As no appreciable time had lapsed between the officer's "purchase" of the 
magazines and his recapture of the money, it borders on sophistry to as-
sert, as [the state of Maryland] does that once [Defendant], on his 
employer's behalf, had voluntarily surrendered possession of the 
magazines in exchange for their purchase pnee, he had relinquished all 
interest in the merchandise, retaining an interest only in the monev. 
Hypertechnical applications of principles of property law may not be used 
to defeat close scrutiny of police conduct in obtaining evidence. 
Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Civil Liberties Union at 6 (citations omitted), 
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U S. 463 (1985) Defendant was attempting to establish 
this point in order to be able to make the further argument that since this transac-
tion was indeed a "seizure," the law enforcement officer needed a warrant to make 
it 
36. Macon, 472 U S at 471 (citations omitted) Justice O'Connor added, how-
ever, that the recapture of the $50 bill may well have been an unconstitutional 
seizure. Nonetheless, she stated that "[a]ssummg, arguendo, that the retrieval of the 
money incident to the arrest was wrongful, the proper remedy is restitution or sup-
pression of the $50 bill as evidence of the purchase, not exclusion from evidence of 
(he previously purchased magazines " Id 
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purchase) irrelevant. That is not to say, however, unlike in V\l 
lamonte-Marquez, that if the true reason for the acquisition of the 
magazines in Macon was considered (they were actually "seized" as 
part of a criminal investigation), rather than the operative "fiction" 
that was used (this was simply an ordinary commercial transaction). 
the seizure was pretextual or otherwise unconstitutional. Rather, if 
the Court had assessed this transaction on the basis of the actual 
facts, objective and subjective, it would have been forced to address 
the then-dispositive issue whether a warrantless "seizure" of ob-
scene materials in this fashion was justified in these circumstances. 
If it was, there was no pretext. Hence, the application of the Scott 
language in Macon, unlike the application of Scott in Villamonle-Mai-
quez, does no damage to the concern for the deterrence of pretextual 
fourth amendment activity since the undercover officer in Macon was 
not necessarily acting for improper reasons.37 
Accordingly, the only Supreme Court decision that truly threat-
ens the proposition that pretextual fourth amendment activity is in-
appropriate and unconstitutional is Villamonte-Marquez. But, 
although the Court has not applied the Scott objective test language 
directly in any case other than Villamonte-Marquez, Villamonte-Marqua 
is, nonetheless, not the Court's last, only, or most important word 
on this subject.4 8 
B. Pretext Commentary 
I. My Position 
In a number of articles published since the Scott decision was 
handed down,3" I have, in Professor LaFave's words, "sounded the 
alarm,"40 trying to make two basic and independent points about 
that decision's supposed adoption of an "objective" fourth amend-
ment test and the impact of such a test upon the proof—and rele-
vance—of pretextual search and seizure activity. First, I have 
argued that Supreme Court decisions handed down before and after 
the Scott decision have neither uniformly adopted nor applied an ob-
jective fourth amendment test as was seemingly dictated in Scott, de-
spite the fact that the isolated opinion of Villamonte-Marquez41 
states—or implies—the contrary. That is simply to say that the case 
law is decidedly ambiguous and inconsistent on this subject. In-
37. See sttpra-iexi accompanying note 2. 
38. See infra text accompanying notes 144-207. 
39. Burkoff, Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, supra note 17, at 181-90* Burkoff, 
Pretext Searches, 9 SEARCH 8C SEIZURE L. REP. 25 (1982); Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches 
supra note 2; Burkoff, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 17; Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra 
note 9. J f 
40. See W. I^F.WE, supra note 14, § 1.4(a), at 83. 
41. For a discussion of United States vs Villamonte-Marquez, see supra text ac-
companying notes 25-31. 
1989) PRETEXT SEARCH DOCTRINE 373 
deed, a number of Supreme Court decisions have been handed 
down since Scott—and continue to come down—which, unlike Scott, 
clearly apply fourth amendment doctrine in ways that are far from 
objective, treating the subjective motives of law enforcement of-
ficers engaged in searches and seizures as important, if not disposi-
tive, constitutional considerations, particularly as they relate to 
claims of pretextual activity.42 
Second, I have also argued that, assuming that pretexts are un-
constitutional, the availability of an inquiry into the motives of 
searching or arresting law enforcement officers is not only desirable, 
but critically necessary in order to insure that law enforcement of-
ficers generally will be deterred, through the application of the ex-
clusionary rule, from engaging in pretextual fourth amendment 
activity. By advocating the continued use of such a subjective "bad-
faith" test,43 it is important to point out that I do not urge its use as 
a replacement for an objective test. T o the contrary, I firmly believe 
that its most beneficial—even necessary—use is exactly as it is being 
used today in most state courts across the country44—as a vital sup-
plement to the objective test.45 
2. Professor LaFave s Position 
Professor LaFave has responded to these arguments by agree-
ing with me that given the facts in Scott set forth in the lower court 
opinion and the prior decisions which were not discussed in the ma-
jority opinion, the Scott decision "can hardly be read as a definitive 
analysis settling that in all circumstances fourth amendment sup-
pression issues are to be resolved without assaying 'the underlying 
intent or motivation of the officers involved.' " 4 6 LaFave nonethe-
less argues that such a reading of Scott, although not legally com-
pelled, "is precisely what the rule ought to be."4 7 The reason that 
42. See infra text accompanying notes 144-204. 
43. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2. But see W. LAFAVE, supra note 
14, § 1.4, at 80 (calling the phrase "bad faith" a somewhat inaccurate characteriza-
tion, but nonetheless using it as the title of the appropriate subsection of his 
treatise). 
44. See infra text accompanying note 56. 
45. The protocol for assessing fourth amendment pretexts should be as 
follows: 
Initially, a court should determine whether a search is objectively constitu-
tional or unconstitutional. If the search is objectively unconstitutional, a 
court need proceed no further. If, however, the search is objectively con-
stitutional, the court must next determine (if the issue is raised) whether 
the search was a "bad faith" search. 
Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 116. See also Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 
9, at 696, 703. 
46. W. LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 1.4(a), at 83 (emphasis original). 
47. Id. 
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such an objective approach is the appropriate analysis in pretext 
cases, LaFave contends, is that 
the proper basis of concern is not with why the officer devi-
ated from the usual practice in this case but simply that he 
did deviate. It is the/act of the departure from the accepted 
way of handling such cases which makes the officer's con-
duct arbitrary, and it is the arbitrariness which in this con-
text constitutes the Fourth Amendment violation.48 
Moreover, LaFave argues that "[ujnderlying the Scott rule . . . is the 
sound notion . . . chat 'sending state and federal courts on an expe-
dition into the minds of police officers would produce a grave and 
fruitless misallocation of judicial resources.' "4<) 
However, LaFave's analysis does not, unlike the Supreme Court 
in Villamonte-Marquez, treat fourth amendment pretextual activity as 
constitutionally irrelevant. Far from it. Rather, LaFave's point is 
that pretexts are unconstitutional, but that the existence of such un-
constitutional pretextual activity should be assessed (exclusively) 
objectively. Accordingly, to assess constitutionality in a case of 
questionable conduct, LaFave has proposed that the question that 
should be asked and answered by the appropriate court is whether 
"the Fourth Amendment activity 'was carried out in accordance with 
standard pi ocedures in the local police department.' "5() 
I have criticized LaFave's analysis on this point at length else-
where.51 Suffice it to say that I agree that the use of LaFave's objec-
tive approach is a sensible first step to take in determining whether 
law enforcement officers have committed a fourth amendment viola-
tion.52 What is difficult to understand is why such an objective ap-
proach should also be the final—and exclusive—step in a pretext 
analysis. 
The argument that subjective inquiries into law enforcement of-
ficers' motives are difficult or fruitless53 totally begs the question 
whether they are nonetheless constitutionally appropriate or even 
necessary.54 Indeed, as Professor James Haddad pointed out, "The 
48. Id . § 1 4(c), at 94 (emphasis in original). 
/ u ' t 9 [d d l 9 6 (c*UOUnS Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 US 560, 565 (1968) 
(W hue, J dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari as improvidently granted)) 
50 Id (quoting South Dakota v Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 374-75 (1976) (em-
phasis original)). ' v 
51 • Burkoff Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2. at 107-11. See also Haddad, supra 
note lb, at 650-ol. r 
52. See supra note 45 and text accompanying notes 43-45 
ftC^ L
 See suPra l e x t accompanying note 49; W LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 1 4(e) at 
9b ( there is no reason to believe that courts can with any degree of success deter-
mine in which instances the police had an ulterior motive *'), Amsterdam, Perspec-
tives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN L REV. 349, 436-37 (1974) 
54 'If justice requires [a] fact to be ascertained, the difficult) of doing so is no 
ground for refusing to try " O W HOIMES. THE COMMON LXW 48 (1881) 
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worst that one could say [about a subjective inquiry] is that under 
such an approach, because of the difficulty of proof, the prosecution 
*ould sometimes benefit from evidence discovered through pretex-
tual fourth amendment activity/*55 How different is this difficulty of 
proof from the difficulty the defense ordinarily has on every sup-
pression motion? Moreover, the fruitlessness argument is simply, 
soundly, and empirically disproved by the scores of federal and state 
court decisions in which such motivational evidence has been found 
to be readily available (and, accordingly, where a finding of pretext 
has been treated as dispositive of the constitutionality of the 
search).5*' 
55 Haddad, supra note 16, at 685 Haddad adds 
1 he typical criticism of Professor Burkoff's approach is quite unsophistica-
ted Ignoring the many areas of constitutional law analysis where the 
Court has assigned motive a role, or where the Court has denied it a role 
only after extensive discussion, the critics often dismiss, in a sentence or 
two, the [subjective] methodology of resolving pretextual fourth amend-
ment claims. But if constitutional law sometimes makes motive deter-
• minative of outcome—even in contexts where the search for motive is 
more difficult than in the pretextual search context—difficulty of ascertain-
ment cannot suffice to defeat the use of motive in pretextual search 
analysis 
Id at 681-82 (footnotes omitted) 
56 See. eg , United States v Smith, 802 F 2d 1119. 1124 (9th Cir 1986) (cita-
tions omitted) ("Whether an arrest is a mere pretext to search turns on the motiva-
tion or primary purpose of the arresting officers Courts have found improper 
motivation where the defendant is arrested for a minor offense so as to allow police 
to search for evidence of some other unrelated offense for which police lack prob-
able cause to arrest or search "). 
For some of the many recentlv reported decisions suppressing evidence based 
upon a finding of pretext, see, eg , United States v Miller, 821 F 2d 546 (11th Cir. 
1987), United States v Merchant, 760 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1985), cert granted, 478 
V S 1003 (1986), cert dismissed, 480 U S 615 (1987); United States v. Johnson, 722 
K2d 525 (9th Cir 1983); United States v Prim, 698 F 2d 972 (9th Cir 1983); 
fiuied States v. Ospina, 618 F Supp 1486 (E D N Y 1985), United States v Mil-
lu>. 588 F Supp 45 (W D N Y 1984), United States v Abbott, 584 F. Supp 442 
t\V D Pa ), aff'd, 749 F 2d 28 (3d Cir. 1984), United Slates v Belcher, 577 F. Supp 
1241 (ED Va 1983), United Stales v Nelson, 511 F Supp 77 (W D Tex 1980), 
I'mied States v Keller, 499 K Supp 415 (ND III. 1980); United States v Sanford, 
493 F. Supp 78 (D.D C. 1980); Spann v. State. 494 So. 2d 716 (Ala. Cnm. App. 
1985), aff'd on other grounds, 494 So. 2d 719 (Ala. 1986); Guzman v. State, 283 Ark. 
112 672 S.W 2d 656 (1984); People v. Howard, 162 CaJ. App. 3d 8, 208 Cal. Rptr. 
353(1984), People v. Dickson, 144 Cal. App 3d 1046, 192 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1983); 
People v. Albntton, 138 Cal. App 3d 79, 187 Cal Rptr 652 (1982); People v. 
Re>nolds, 672 P 2d 529 (Colo. 1983); State v. Miller, 420 A.2d 181 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1980), Nealy v State, 400 So 2d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 
419 So 2d 336 (Fla 1982), Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App 476, 277 S E.2d 923, 
tert denied, 454 U S 823 (1981), Gaston v. Slate, 155 Ga App 337, 270 S E 2d 877 
(1980), State v Knight, 63 Han 90, 621 P 2d 370 (1980); People v. Reincke, 84 III. 
App 3d 222, 405 N E 2d 430 (1980); State v. Killcrease, 379 So 2d 737 (La. 1980); 
State v Hams, 504 So 2d 156, (La Ct App 1987), Smith v Stale, 48 Md App. 
425, 427 A 2d 1064 (1981). Manalansan v. State, 45 Md App 667. 415 A.2d 308 
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Furthermore, LaFave's argument that only the objective "fact" 
of a law enforcement officer's arbitrary deviation from the "usual 
practice'* or "standard procedures'* should be relevant to fourth 
amendment pretext analysis raises more problems than it resolves 
Not only do a police department's usual practices or standard pro-
cedures (where they exist) have no constitutional status per sey thev 
may indeed be unconstitutional.57 Nor is a concern about law en-
forcement arbitrariness the only doctrinal concern the Supreme 
Court must consider in fourth amendment cases. When a law en-
forcement officer acts pretextually, the Court must be equally or 
more concerned about the simple fact that it has failed to get the 
message across to the officer that he or she needed a lawful justifica-
tion for acting before fourth amendment activity could be under-
taken In other words, not only has the law enforcement officer who 
acts pretextually acted arbitrarily,58 he or she has also acted (by defi-
nition) for reasons which he 01 she should have known do not justifv 
such conduct Such illegal conduct should—must—be deterred 
The Supreme Court has made it crystal clear on many occasions 
(1980), People v Siegel, 95 Mich App 594, 291 N W 2d 134 (1980), State v Blair. 
691 S W 2d 259 (Mo 1985), cert granted, 474 U S 1049 (1986), cert dismissed, 480 
U S 698 (1987). State v Carlson, 198 Mont 1 13, 644 P 2d 498 (1982); Hatle> v 
State, 100 Ne\ 214, 678 P 2d 1160 (1984), Stale v Sidebotham, 124 N H 682,474 
A 2d 1377 (1984), People v Pace, 65 N Y 2d 684, 481 N E 2d 250, 491 N Y S 2d 
618 (1985), People v Llopis, 125 A D 2d 416, 509 N Y£ 2d 135, (N Y App DIN 
1986), People v Auletta, 88 A D 2d 867, 452 N Y S 2d 32 (Sup Ct 1982), People 
v Castro, 125 Misc 2d 15, 479 N Y S 2d 414 (Sup Ct 1984), People v Griffin, lib 
Misc 2d 751, 456 N Y S 2d 334 (Sup Ct 1982), State v Hall, 52 N C App 492 
2 7 9 S E 2 d Ml, cert denied, 304 N C 198, 215 SE 2d 104 (1981), Commonwealth v 
Landamus. 333 Pa Super 382, 482 A 2d 619 (1984), Commonwealth v Corbin, 
322 Pa Super 271, 469 A 2d 615 (1983), State v Crabtree, 655 S W 2d 173 
(Tenn Cnm App 1983), Black v State, 739 S VV 2d 240 (Tex Cnm App 1987) 
King v State, 733 S YV 2d 704 (Tex App 1987), Webb v State, 695 S W 2d 676 
(Tex Cnm App 1985), affd on other grounds, 739 S W 2d 802 (Tex Cnm App 
1987) (en banc), Meeks v State, 692 S W 2d 504 (Tex Cnm App 1985), McMillan 
v State, 609 S VV 2d 784 ( Tex Cnm App 1980), State v Rite, 717 P 2d 695 (Utah 
1986), State \ S.eira, 754 P 2d 972 (Utah Ct App 1988). State v Hygh, 711 P 2d 
264 (Utah 1985), State \ Harm, 671 P 2d 175 (Utah 1983), Hart v Common 
wealth, 221 Va 283, 269 S L 2d 806 (1980), State v Loewen, 97 Wash 2d 562, 647 
P.2d 489 (1982), State v Houser, 95 Wash 2d 143, 622 P 2d 1218 (1980), State \ 
Simpson, 95 Wash 2d 170, 622 P 2d 1199 (1980), Slate v Daugherty, 94 Wash 2d 
263, 616 P 2d 649 (1980), cert denied, 450 US 958 (1981); Brown v State, 738 P 2d 
1092 (Wyo 1987) See also citations collected at Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra 
note 2, at 113 n213 
Some stale and federal courts have, ironically, adopted Professor LaFave's ra-
tionale for rejecting the use of a subjective pietext test, i e this t>pe of analysis is 
fruitless, when pretextual fourth amendment activity was alreadv established on the 
record' 
57 See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 107-11 
58 Moreover, an arbitrary search (in the sense of one deviating from usual 
practices) may not be unconstitutional See eg United Si ales v Caceres, 440 U S 
741, 755-57 (1979), Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 110 
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in the recent past that its principal or only reason for applying an 
exclusionary rule to remedy fourth amendment violations is the 
general deterrence of police officers.59 Only the use of a subjective 
pretext test serves to deter those police officers who have no inten-
tion of following the law, but are nonetheless "savvy" enough to 
make their conduct appear (objectively) as if it is lawful. These are 
the police officers, for example, who stop cars or boats to look for 
narcotics and who later sit in court while a prosecutor argues a fic-
tion, namely that such stops were lawful because the stops were in 
fact regulatory, undertaken in order to enforce the traffic or regis-
tration, not narcotics, laws. Only **[t]he use of a subjective pretext 
analysis carries with it a simple and understandable, if not classic, 
general deterrent message: to search, you must act for the reasons 
lhat justify the search."60 
An example I have used before may be useful to illustrate this 
point: 
We do not want to deter the searching police officer who 
honestly and forthnghtly acts to search for drugs on the 
basis of his recognition of the odor of marijuana. We do, 
however, want to deter the searching police officer who 
searches for wholly improper reasons using a search for 
drugs as a pretext. Since the objective conduct and circum-
stances might well appear exactly the same in both cases, 
the only way to assess accurately when an improper search 
has occurred and thus the only way to deter police officers 
from engaging in such improper activities is to focus on the 
searching officer's subjective intent. Such a subjective fo-
cus to exclusionary doctrine should serve to "instruct" the 
police generally that such an improper intent is just that— 
improper—and will accordingly, result in rendering a 
search unconstitutional no matter how pristine it might 
otherwise objectively, fortuitously appear.61 
3. Professor Haddad s Position 
Professor James Haddad takes a completely different approach 
to the subject of pretexts.62 He argues, contrary to my and to Pro-
fessbr LaFave's position, that there is absolutely no ambiguity in 
Supreme Court decisions relating to pretextual fourth amendment 
59. See, eg, United States v Leon, 468 U S 897, reh'g denied, 468 U S 1250 
(1984), Stone v Powell, 428 U S 465 (1976), United States v Jams. 428 U S 433, 
rrhg denied, 429 U S 874 (1976), United States v. Calandra, 404 U S 338 (1974) 
60 Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 702 
61 Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 111-12 
62 See generally Haddad, supra note 16, Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, Claims 
of Sham and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J CRIM. L SC CRIMINOLOC\ 198, 204-14 
(1977). 
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activity. Rather, Haddad claims that what he calls "the hard-choi(| 
approach . . . is the only approach to the pretext problem that thf 
Supreme Court has used consistently.*'63 By the "hard-choice apt 
proach," Haddad is referring to his theory that 
the Supreme Court has consistently taken into account the 
possibility of pretextual fourth amendment activity in de-
termining whether to expand a particular fourth amend-
ment limitation upon police conduct. Sometimes it has left 
police piactices untouched, sometimes it has narrowed the 
scope of police practices; always it has considered govern-
mental and individual interests and not just pretext 
possibilities.64 
To clarify his point, Haddad contrasts his "hard-choice" ap-[ 
proach to what he calls the "case-by-case" approach to pretexts! 
wherein "courts examine pretext claims on a case-by-case basis, ex I 
eluding the product of the fourth amendment activity if they findl 
that officers exercised the [search or seizure] power pretextually."65 
In contrast to the case-by-case approach, Haddad argues that the 
Supreme Court should—and does—simply craft its fourth amend 
ment doctrine in the form of general rules, forged with the recogni-
tion that pretexts should be deterred thereby. Since, accordingly 
pretexts are only to be considered by the Supreme Court in the craft-
ing of general rules, when a pretext is apparent on the facts of a 
particular case, lower courts must, Haddad counsels, grjf their teeth 
and simply ignore it.6*' | 
Haddad further subdivides the case-by-case approach to pre-| 
texts into two sub-categories: my approach, described previously,67 
which he titles the "individual motivation" approach,68 and 
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63 Haddad, supra note 16, at 653 (footnote omitted) 
64 Id at 673 
65 Id at 649 
66 This is no overstatement See, eg , Haddad, supra note 16, at 692 
After cow is have reexamined various fourth amendment rules under 
the hard-choice approach, eliminating some, narrowing some, and leaving 
some unmodified, possibilities for pretextual use will remain Courts have 
eliminated roving patrol license check stops, for example They could 
limit the power to enter a suspect's home under the authority of a dated 
warrant But we know that thev will not prevent the police from stopping 
speeding motorists Because this is so, under the hard-choice approach the po-
lice will always have an opportunity to stop speeding motorists tn the hope of observing 
evidence of a robbery m plain view The hard-choice approach says "so be it 
Id (footnotes omitted, emphasis added) 
67 See sup)a text accompanying notes 39-45 
68 Haddad, supra note 16, at 681 passim Professor Haddad concedes, as he 
must, that this approach is not just mine, indeed that "(mjany lower courts have 
adopted this motivation approach " Id at 649 (footnote omitted) See also id at 693 
("I must acknowledge that hundreds of opinions from other courts agree with [Pro-
tessor Buikoil s} basic approach ") 
LaFave's approach,69 which ignominiously untitled, Haddad accu-
rately describes as focusing upon "whether the police departed 
from standard procedures."70 Professor Haddad generously con-
tributes to my continuing legal education by spending fifty-four 
pages dissecting, explaining, and criticizing my approach,71 but sim-
ply dismisses LaFave's approach out-of-hand, in his words, "because 
1 am not sure how it would operate."72 
I have very briefly responded to Professor Haddad's criticisms 
elsewhere.73 I think he was wrong in 1985 when he argued that no 
prior Supreme Court decision had ever recognized the existence of 
a pretext search doctrine, or at least a doctrine which could be ap-
plied m individual cases 74 More important, whatever the true im-
port of Supreme Court precedents, I thought then and think now 
that he is dead wrong when he argues that use of my subjective pre-
text analysis is inappropriate as a matter of sensible fourth amend-
ment policy. Haddad summarized his complaints about my 
approach as follows: 
The individual motivation methodology punishes the pros-
ecution where an officer has acted within the letter of the 
law to further the laudable goal of obtaining incriminating 
evidence. More importantly, an individual motivation 
methodology shifts the focus away from the most impor-
tant issues: the existence and scope of fourth amendment 
limitations. Unlike the hard-choice approach, it tends to 
inhibit critical reassessment and deserved expansion of 
fourth amendment limitations.75 
I have three problems with this analysis. First, a law enforce-
ment officer who is acting pretextually simply is not acting "within 
the letter of the law,'*76 a point that Haddad ultimately is moved to 
69 See supra text accompanying notes 46-61 
70 Haddad, supra note 16, at 650 (footnote omitted) As noted previously, 
because LaFave feels that the Scott decision provides the language, if not the analy-
sis, which underlies his approach, it is typically referred to as the "objective" anal)-
sis in contrast to my "subjective" analysis 
71 Haddad, supra note 16 (Authorial aside I am teasing, of course, Jim, and 
appreciate the many kind comments you also had to offer about my work.) 
72. Id. at 650 (footnote omitted). Haddad does, however, seemingly associate 
himself with my criticisms of LaFave*s approach. See id. at 650 n.43, 675-76, 681-
85 
73. See Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9. Professor LaFave has merely consigned 
Haddad to citation in a footnote. See W LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 1 4(a), at 81 n 3. 
74 See Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 695-99 
75 Haddad, supra note 16, at 681 
76 For example, in South Dakota v Opperman, 428 U S 364 (1976), the 
Supreme Court held constitutional suspicionless automobile inventory searches 
that are not "a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive " Id. at 376 
Hence, if a law enforcement officer undertakes an automobile inventory search as a 
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concede.77 Second, unless we are to stand the Constitution on its 
head, it is obviously not "laudable*' for a law enforcement officer to 
attempt to obtain incriminating evidence by pretextual, i.e., constitu-
tionally unjustified, means. To hold otherwise is essentially to argue 
that the Bill of Rights and interpretive judicial decisions need not be 
followed because good ends justify bad (unconstitutional) means.78 
Nor are all police investigatory ends good ones. Treating pretexts 
as if they were "laudable" would often serve to "cover up" discrimi-
natory police activity.79 
Finally, Haddad's criticisms of the subjective approach to pre-
texts are ofT base. Haddad essentially compares and contrasts all of 
his approach and only part of mine, neglecting the fact that my sub-
jective approach is designed—and has often been used80—not to 
supplant his desired "hard-choice" reassessment of fourth amend-
ment doctrine, but rather to supplement it.KI In fairness, Haddad . 
does ultimately acknowledge that "[o]f course, the Court could still f 
reexamine various fourth amendment doctrines while simultane-
ously retaining an individual motivation approach."82 He nonethe-
less ultimately dismisses this possibility because, in his words: "I 
believe, however, that the availability of an individual motivation ap-
proach serves as a 'crutch/ It allows the Court to justify a particular 
police practice by declaring . . . that the Court will deal with abuses 
of the power on a case-by-case basis."83 
pretext concealing an investigatory motive, that clearly is not an aft undertaken 
"within the letter of the law." See Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 699-700. 
77. As Haddad generously concludes his article, "Professor BurkoflHs articles 
have made me realize that to assert that . . . an improperly motivated officer acts 
within the boundaries of an established fourth amendment doctrine begs the ques-
tion." Haddad, supra note 16, at 693. 
78. "Law enforcement officers cannot break down doors without probable 
cause, rummage through homes indiscriminately, or arrest anyone they want with-
out sufficient justification at law—even if they are honestly looking for criminal evi-
dence in the process." Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 700. 
79. See, e.g.. People v. Castro, 125 Misc. 2d 15. 479 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (Sup. Ct. 
1984) ("it appears that members of the squad patrolling in minority neighborhoods 
may use the pretext of (investigating] possible taxi crime as an excuse for stopping 
gypsy cabs and searching the passengers with the hope of finding guns or other 
contraband"). 
80. See supra citations at note 56. 
81. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45, and text accompanying note 52. 
82. Haddad. supia note 16, at 688. 
83. hi. at 688-89 (citations omitted). Haddad adds: "The more "outrageous' 
the pretextual use of a power, the more likely a defense lawyer will argue pretext 
and will fail to argue that a court should narrow the underlying power." Id. at 689. 
It is difficult to understand why, however, the reasonably capable defense attorney 
would not—and should not be able lo—make both arguments. Under Professor 
Haddad's analysis, only the latter argument would be available to defense counsel 
who, arguing at the suppression court level, would be unlikely (to put it mildly) to 
hinge his or her whole defense on attempting to convince a suppression court to 
establish a new constitutional rule. 
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This is an odd argument. If Haddad is arguing that the availa-
bility of such a case-by-case approach (mine or LaFave's) has in fact 
ierved as a "crutch" for the Supreme Court in the past, then he is 
effectively confessing error as to his earlier argument that Supreme 
Court precedent reveals the prior, unequivocal rejection of that ap-
proach.84 If Haddad is arguing instead that the adoption of such a 
tase-by-case approach would serve as a "crutch" if and when it is ever 
used, it is difficult to imagine why that would—or should—be so. 
Since there is no dispute over the fact that the subjective proof of 
pretext can be exceedingly difficult for defense counsel to make, it is 
hard to imagine why the Supreme Court would rely on that unlikely 
possibility as a rationale for otherwise crafting the main body of its 
fourth amendment law so as to ignore the threat of pretextual activ-
ity altogether. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, "[t]he fact that 
pretexts are difficult for defense counsel to establish except in ex-
ceptional cases should give the Supreme Court additional incentive 
to make 'hard choices' as to the desirable scope of fourth amend-
ment powers as a generic matter."*aK »85 
III. MISSOURI V. BL.UR 
The Supreme Court had before it during its 1986-1987 Term 
the ideal case in which to adopt, elucidate, or refine its position on 
the proper constitutional import of these pretext search issues. The 
case was Missouri v. Blair, in which certiorari was granted in January 
of 1986.86 The facts in Blair lent themselves to analysis in paradig-
matic fashion of all of the pretext issues discussed above. 
A. The Facts 
On November 24, 1981, Kansas City, Missouri police officers 
discovered the dead body of 59-year-old Carl Lindstedt in a park 
lagoon. Lindstedt had been bound hand and foot and shot. The 
only solid evidence found near the scene of the crime was a palm 
print discovered behind the passenger door on the victim's truck, 
which was discovered parked a quarter mile away from the body. 
The search for Lindstedt's killer got nowhere.87 
On January 22, 1982, two months after Lindstedt's body was 
found, an unknown tipster telephoned an investigator in the county 
prosecutor's office and reported that she had talked to some chil-
84. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64. 
85. Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 701 (footnote omitted). 
86. 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), cert, dismissed, 480 U.S. 698 (1987). 
87. Facts are drawn from the Missouri Supreme Court's opinion, State v. Blair, 
691 S.W.2d 259. 260 (Mo. 1985), from the unpublished Missouri Court of Appeals 
opinion, State v. Blair, No. WD35622 (Mo. Ct. App. July 3, 1984), and from the 
Briefs of the parlies to the Supreme Court. 
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dren who said that they had overheard members of the Blair famil\ 
bragging about their involvement in the murder Based upon this 
double hearsay tip, palm prints on file of three of the Blair famih 
members were examined by the police and were found not to mauh 
the print found at the scene of the crime The police did not, hou 
ever, have a palm print of the fourth Blair family member, Zola 
Blair, on file So, on January 23, 1982, a Kansas City homicide 
detective issued a so-called "pick up" order to bring Zola Blair in to 
the stationhouse for questioning about the Lmdstedt murder The 
detective, according to the Missouri Supreme Court, summarizing 
the trial court's finding and testimony, "did not ask for a homicide 
arrest or search warrant because he believed there was not enough 
evidence to suppoit a warrant "Mrt 
On February 5, 1982, Zola Blair was picked up by the Kansas 
City police She was taken to the downtown homicide unit, booked 
for homicide, detained overnight in jail, interrogated, and her palm 
and finger prints were taken After denying any knowledge of the 
murder during interrogation, she was released at 10 45 am the 
next dav Three davs later, however, Blair was arrested and booked 
once again for homicide—her palm print taken on February 5, 1982, 
had matched the one found at the scene of the enme 
After Zola Blair's arrest, her attorney moved to suppress the 
palm print taken from his client after she was "picked up" by the 
Kansas City police as well as some incriminating statements she 
made after being confronted with the evidence cf( the matching 
prints His rationale for suppression was that the police lacked 
probable cause to "pick up" Zola Blair for homicide before they had 
matched her palm print, the "pick up" was therefore unconstitu-
tional, and the print and subsequent statements were, as a result, 
suppressible fruits of this unconstitutional act 
This suppression argument was not difficult to win The United 
States Supreme Court has made it clear that, whatever the police 
call it, when vou "pick up" someone, take them to the stationhouse 
and hold them for questioning, that's an "arrest" (a "seizure" in 
fourth amendment terminology) 89 And to make an arrest, the po-
lice must have "probable cause" to believe that the arrestee commu-
ted a crime 90 
In Zola Blair's case, it is clear that the police did not have prob-
able cause with respect to her participation in the Lmdstedt murder 
88 State v Blair 691 S VV 2d 259 260 (Mo 1985) cert panted sub nom Mis 
soun v Blair 474 US 1049 (1986) cert dismissed 480 US 698 (1987) 
89 See eg Dunjuay v Ntu York 442 US 200 216 (1979) ( detention for 
custodial mftriogdtjon—regirdlos of its Idfocl—intrudts «>o stvtrelv on interests 
protected b\ the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safe 
guards against illegal arrest ) 
90 I S CONST amend IV See supra note 30 and accompaming text 
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before they picked her up and took her palm print They only had 
an unknown informant's uncorroborated, double hearsay tip that 
Zola Blair's family was bragging about the murder91 This kind of 
unsupported accusation is not—and can never be—enough, by it-
self, to establish probable cause to arrest someone If it were 
deemed to be enough, probable cause would become a meaningless 
requirement, anyone could arrange the arrest of a person he or she 
disliked simply by calling the nearest police station and anony-
mously accusing that person of committing a crime Worse still, po-
lice officers would never have to uncover any real probable cause 
information in order to make an arrest because they could always 
use as justification the anonymous tip they (allegedly) received that 
implicated the arrestee Indeed, in Zola Blair's case, after her attor-
ney made his motion to suppress the evidence against her, the pros-
ecution ultimately conceded that the informant's tip was not enough 
lo establish probable cause to arrest her—and the Missouri courts 
readily agreed with this conclusion 92 
Given this expurgated factual recitation, the Blair case, while 
troubling because it raises the possibility that someone who may 
have been at a murder scene may go untried for lack of admissible 
evidence, raises no original or sophisticated fourth amendment is-
sues This would be true even if we knew (which we do not) that Zola 
Blair was actually involved in the Lmdstedt murder As Justice 
Scaha has recently acknowledged for the Supreme Court, "There is 
nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insu-
lates the criminality of a few in order to protect the pnvacy of us 
all "93 
But, the plot thickens as a few additional facts are added to the 
tale When the police arrived at Zola Blair's home (actually Zola 
Blair's mother's home where Zola lived) to execute the "pick up'* 
order on February 5, 1982, they allegedly saw a car illegally parked 
outside the house Upon radioing the address back to the dis-
patcher before entering the house, thev discovered that Zola herself 
was not only a murder "suspect," she was also the subject of an 
outstanding municipal parking violation "warrant " (Actually, no 
physical warrant existed, just an entry noting the existence of the 
parking violation in a computerized file) 
91 The state also alleged that the police had found the victim's sofa in the 
home of James Blair Brief for Petitioner at 6, Missouri v Blair, 474 V S 1049 
(1986) But no tie was demonstrated between 7ola Blair and this residence or the 
sofa and this fact was not considered relevant by the Missouri courts 
92 * In this case it is undisputed that the police lacked probable cause to 
arrest defendant on the homicide charge " State v Blair 691 S VV 2d 259, 261 
(Mo 1985), State v Blair No WD35622 (Mo Ct App Julv 3, 1984) (* it was con-
ceded that there existed no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant*) 
93 Arizona v Hicks, 107 S Ct 1149 1155(1987) 
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As a result, when Zola Blair's defense attorney successfully ar 
gued in the Missouri courts that the unknown informant's double 
hearsay tip did not establish probable cause to arrest her for homi 
cide, the prosecution responded that, in that event, the informants 
tip should be treated as irrelevant because Zola Blair was arrested 
for the paiking violation Since she was lawfully under arrest/or 
something, the argument went, her palm prints were constitutional 
acquned 
The Missouri courts were not, however, so easily deceived 
Blair's defense attorney won his pretrial suppression motion in the 
trial court and had it affirmed by the Missouri Court of Appeals and 
the Missouri Supreme Court He won because the Missouri courts 
recognized what was absolutely crystal clear on the record before 
them, namely that Zola Blair was arrested for homicide, not bad 
parking I he prosecution, the Missouri courts concluded, brought 
up the parking violation "wairant" simply as a pretext to justify her 
otherwise unlawful arrest for homicide As the Missouri Supreme 
Court ruled, even "lajssuming an arrest for the parking violation 
the arrest, in the circumstances of this case, was at best a pretext 
employed to gather evidence on an unrelated homicide "94 
On the facts, it is rather hard, if not impossible, to quibble with 
the Missouri Supieme Court's conclusion it was a homicide detective 
who ordered Zola Blair's "pick up," she was given Miranda warnings 
(people booked for traffic offenses in this jurisdiction are not given 
such warnings), she was taken to the downtown homicfde unit (people 
booked for parking violations in this jurisdiction are taken to district 
police stations or the headquarters detention unit, whichever is 
nearer), her finger and palm prints were taken when she arrived 
downtown as is standard procedure for a homicide (people booked on 
parking offenses in this jurisdiction have only a right index finger 
impression taken), she was booked on the homicide charges, and she 
was questioned by homicide detectives about the homicide 95 It was not 
until after the homicide unit released her on February 6, 1982, that 
Zola Blair was picked up again, fourteen minutes later, then 
"booked" on the parking violation and an impression of her nght 
index finger taken The Missouri Supreme Court concluded on this 
plain record, as it affirmed the court of appeal's affirmance of the 
trial court's order suppressing the evidence against Blair that "[t]he 
record in this case supports the ruling of the trial court The execu-
tion of the parking violation warrant was but a subterfuge or pretext 
to gather evidence of the unrelated crime of homicide "96 
Neither the Missouri Court of Appeals nor the Missoun 
94 State v Blair, 691 S W 2d 259, 262 (Mo 1985), cert granted sub nom Mis-
soun v Blair, 474 U S 1049, cert dismissed 480 U S 698 (1987) 
95 Id, State v Blair, No WD35622 (Mo Ct App July 3, 1984) 
96 6 9 ' S W 2 d at 263 
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Supreme Court discussed the question whether this pretext was es-
tablished on the record objectively or subjectively. This is not sur-
prising There was no reason to discuss or choose between these 
approaches since, as the objective evidence was crystal clear,97 there 
was no need to look at the arresting officers' subjective motivations, 
which were, in any event, equally clear 98 The Missouri Supreme 
Court simply cited federal and Missoun authorities for the settled 
proposition that "an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search 
for evidence"99 and reasoned that t4[u]nderlying these cases is ap-
preciation for the far reaching consequences of allowing the com-
mon offense of a traffic violation to serve as a justification for an 
otherwise unconstitutional search " , 0° On this basis, a four-justice 
majority of the Court affirmed the trial court order sustaining Blair's 
motion to suppress, holding that "[t]he record in this case supports 
the ruling of the trial court The execution of the parking violation 
warrant was but a subterfuge or pretext to gather evidence of the 
unrelated crime of homicide " , ( ) l Three Missouri Supreme Court 
justices dissented Justice Blackmar, writing for the dissenters, con-
cluded m contrast to the majority opinion that <4[t]he common 
theme of the pretext cases is that the police arrested people without 
reason The police had a valid pre-existing warrant for Zola Blair's 
97 See supra text accompanying note 94 
98 The officer who took Blair into custody testified for example, that he went 
to her home to pick her up pursuant to the * pick up ' order from the homicide unit 
and that he intended to detain her on that basis Brief for Respondent at 16, Mis-
soun v Blair, 474 U S 1049 (1986) (citing hearing transcript at 42-43) See also 
State v Blair, No WD35622 (Mo Ct App July 3, 1984) ("[Patrolman] Stewart 
testified that he went to the residence to pick her up on the homicide pickup") 
99 State v Blair, 691 S W 2d 260, 262 (Mo 1985) (citing United States v Lef-
kowitz, 285 U S 452 (1932), 1 aglavore v United States, 291 F 2d 262, 265 (9th 
Or 1961), State v Goodman, 449 S W 2d 656 (Mo 1970), State v Howell, 543 
S W 2d 836, 838 (Mo App 1976)), cert gran ted su b nom Missouri v Blair, 474 U S 
1049 (1986), cert dismissed, 480 U S 689 (1987) 
100 691 S W 2d at 263 (citing Amador-Gonzalez v United States, 391 F 2d 308 
(5th Cir 1968)) 
101 691 S W 2d at 263 See also State v Blair, No WD35622 (Mo Ct App July 
3, 1984) (*'[I]t appears beyond peradventure that [Blair's] arrest on the parking 
violation charge was but a pretext, motivated by the police officers' desire to gather 
evidence, in violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the 
United States Constitution ") 
The Missouri Supreme Court further ruled that 
[t]he palm and finger prints and statements obtained on February 5, 1982, 
were properly suppressed because they resulted from an unlawful arrest 
and search Because the illegally seized evidence provided the sole basis 
for the arrest warrant for homicide on February 8, 1982 and led directly 
to [Blair's] statements on that day, the warrant and statement are also 
inadmissible as "fruits of the poisonous tree 
691 S W 2d at 263 (quoting Wong Sun v United Slates, 371 U S 471 (1963)) The 
state's further argument that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary 
rule applied was held to be "without merit " Id 
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arrest. Any procedural irregularities which occurred afterward 
should not invalidate the arrest.,,,()2 
B Argument to the Supreme Court 
After certiorari was granted on the state's petition, the state's 
argument to the Supreme Court on the pretext issues boiled down 
to advocacy of two basic points.103 First, the state argued that 
Blair's 
arrest on an outstanding, pre-existing arrest warrant for a 
municipal parking violation, justified her custodial arrest 
and the taking of a full set of fingerprints incident to that 
arrest, and the arrest and subsequent search were not ren-
dered 'pretextual* and therefore in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment simply because the police also wished to ques-
tion her about an unrelated homicide and take her finger-
prints so that they could be compared to a palm print 
found at the scene of the homicide.104 
Second, the state argued that 44[t]he decision of the Missouri 
Supreme Court essentially holds that an objectively lawful arrest, 
made pursuant to a valid warrant, can somehow be transformed into 
an invalid arrest merely because of the subjective intent of the ar-
resting officers. Such reasoning has repeatedly been rejected by this 
Court."105 
The thrust of Zola Blair's response to these arguments106 was 
102 691 S W 2d at 267 Justice Blackmar added that 
[ijnasmuch as there was basis for a lawful arrest, the order of proceedings 
should make no difference The time of booking on the traffic warrant is 
an immaterial circumstance It would be ludicrous to suggest that sup-
pression must be ordered because the police did not retake her finger-
prints after she was booked on the traffic warrant 
Id. at 266. 
103 The state also argued in the alternative that even if the arrest was pretex-
tual and, hence, unconstitutional, the suppression order was nonetheless inappro-
priate because (1) the arresting officers acted in good failji. (2) the evidence would 
nonetheless have been inevitably discovered, and/or Zola Blair's subsequent state-
ments were not fruits of the illegality Brief for Petitioner at 34, Missoun v. Blair, 
474 VS. 1049 (1986) 
104. Id. at 12 (emphasis added) The state conceded that, "[t]o be sure, the 
police were more interested in determining the extent of [Zola Blair's] involvement 
in the death of 59-year-old Carl Lindstedt than they were in making her answer for 
the municipal parking violation Id at 15 
105. Id at 12 (citations to Scott, Villamonte-Marquez, and Macon omitted). The 
Scott, ViUamonte-Alarquez, and Macon decisions are discussed supra text accompanying 
notes 10-38 
106 Blair also argued that the parking warrant arrest was in any event unlawful 
under Missouri law which requires actual possession of the arrest warrant and that 
no exception to the exclusionary rule appropriately applied Brief for Respondent 
at 10. 13, 18-l<), 41-45, Missouri v Blair, 474 US 1049 (1986) 
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that the supposed parking violation arrest was clearly "a pretext 
concealing a motive to arrest for the primary purpose of searching 
for and seizing [her] inked palm impressions and interrogating her 
pursuant to a homicide investigation.",07 Hence, she argued, the 
Missouri Supreme Court acted correctly in upholding the trial 
court's suppression of the fruits of that pretextual arrest because 
"[a]n arrest ostensibly for one purpose but in reality for the primary 
purpose of furthering an ulterior goal is unreasonable under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.",(>8 
C Analysis 
In light of the pretext commentaries previously discussed,109 
the pretext issues expressly or impliedly resolved in the majority 
and dissenting opinions of the Missouri Supreme Court in Blair can 
be parsed as follows. The Blair majority rejected (if implicitly) Pro-
fessor Haddad's "hard choices" approach to pretext analysis, using 
instead what Haddad called the "case-by-case" approach that per-
mits consideration of the existence of pretextual activity in each in-
dividual case.110 The Blair majority did not, however, explicitly use 
either Professor LaFave's "objective" case-by-case analysis of pre-
texts or my "subjective" case-by-case analysis. As previously noted, 
on the record in the Blair case, there was no need to be explicit 
about which case—by—case approach was being used.111 Even 
under my so-called "subjective approach" to pretext analysis, a re-
viewing court need not assess the relevant law enforcement officers 
subjective motivation for engaging in fourth amendment activity when 
107 Id at 11. 
108 Id (cuing Abel v United States, 362 U S 217 (1960), United States v. Lef-
kowitz, 285 U S 452 (1932)) The court in Blair added* 
Overlooking the primary purpose of a search or seizure would reap such 
abuse, encourage such capricious searches and arrests, and engender such 
disrespect and resentment of law enforcement that this Court should not 
adopt such a position Exceptions to the warrant requirement would be 
used as investigative tools instead of for the purpose they were created. 
Traffic offenses are easily committed, authorizing arrests in most states. 
Searches of the person and automobile would follow automatically. In-
ventory searches of impounded vehicles would be used as investigative 
tools The plain view doctrine would no longer require discovery of evi-
dence to be inadvertent. Administrative warrants pursuant to health, fire 
and building codes could be used to further cnmmal investigations. Police 
would generate facts ostensibly calling for the application of an exception 
to the warrant requirement or for a warrant. This search or arrest power 
would then be used for exploratory searches, out of caprice, or to harass 
or punish 
Id at 11-12 
109 See supra text accompanying notes 39-85 
110 See supra text accompanying notes 62-85 
111 See supra text accompanying notes 97-98. 
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the objective facts clearly demonstrate—as they did here—that a pre 
text was present. " 2 Since both the objective and subjective facu 
were clear in this case and led to the same conclusion, there *a< 
simply no need to rest the Court's decision upon the arresting of 
fleer's motivations, which were, in any event, confessed!* 
pretextual.113 
The dissenters on the Missouri Supreme Court in Blair took a 
different approach altogether to this subject. They did not dispute 
the proposition that the use of a case-by-case approach to analysis ot 
pretexts as constitutional or unconstitutinal was appropriate,M 
Rather, they concluded that this case simply was not a pretext case 
because "[tjhc common theme of the pretext cases is that the police 
anested people without a reason,"1,5 and that, in this case, "[t]he 
police had a valid pre-existing [parking] warrant for Zola Blair's 
arrest."I,b In short, there was no pretext here, in the dissenters 
view, because the parking violation "was [a] basis for a lawful 
arrest."M7 
This supposed "objective" approach utilized by the Blair dis-
senters should not be confused with Professor LaFave's "objective" 
approach to pretext analysis. They are totally different. Under Pro-
fessor LaFave's approach, the "objective" question to be asked in 
assessing whether a cognizable, unconstitutional pretext exists is 
whether this supposed parking arrest was "carried out in accordance 
with standard procedures in the local police department."118 This 
question is, of course, easy to answer and easily establishes a pretext 
on the Blair facts since the pick-up/arrest clearly deviated from stan-
dard procedures for traffic or parking offenses.119 But that fact of 
arbitrary deviation from standard procedures was irrelevant to the 
Blair dissenters. Rather, their point was that since it was possible to 
make a legitimate parking arrest in the Blair circumstances,120 a 
does not matter for constitutional purposes that this parking arrest 
was not in fact a normal parking arrest or undertaken for that pur-
112 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text 
113 See supra note 98 and accompanying text 
114 State v Blair, 691 S W 2d 259, 266-67 (Mo 1985), cert granted sub nom 
Missouri v Blair, 474 U S 1049 (1986). cert dismissed, 480 US 689 (1987) Th? 
dissent cites a numbci of pretext cases in an approving fashion, but distinguishes 
them on the grounds discussed in the text which follows 
115 Id at 267 
116 Id 
117 Id at 266 
118 See supra text accompanying note 50 
119 See supra text accompanying note 95 
120 This point is, parenthetically, not as self-evident as the Blair dissenters 
thought Under Missouri law in effect at the time of the pick up/arrest, a warrant 
issued on the basis of a nonappearance to answer a parking violation ticket needed 
to be in the possession of the arresting officer in order to be \alidly executed Mo 
RFV STAT $ 544 180 (1978), Rustici v Weidemever, 673 S W 2d 762 (Mo 1984) 
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pose. In short, the Blair dissenters argued that since probable cause 
to arrest Zola Blair for her criminal parking existed, it does not mat-
ter how (LaFave's analysis) or why (my analysis) she was in fact ar-
rested for such a violation. 
I think this is a very dangerous position to take121 and I have 
elsewhere criticized this result-oriented view of pretext law by not-
ing that 
It is one thing to conclude, as both LaFave and this 
author do, that a police officer's improper rationale for a 
search is rendered constitutionally irrelevant when a 
proper and independently sufficient rationale is also pres-
ent at the time of the search; it is another thing entirely to 
argue that an impioper rationale that was the sole basis for 
a search is irrelevant when, absent that rationale, the police 
"would have" engaged in the same search with a proper 
rationale. This hypothetical "proper rationale" bears no 
more relation to the search that was actually conducted 
than does the probable cause that unbeknowst to the 
searching officer "objectively" exists elsewhere in the uni-
verse. Like those "objective" facts, a hypothesized "proper 
rationale" for a search is irrelevant to its constitutionality. 
The search must be evaluated on the basis of the facts upon which the 
officer actually acted, not those that an imaginative prosecutor might 
argue the officer would have acted upon under some other hypotheti-
cal circumstance.} 22 
If the Blair dissenters* narrow view of pretext were to prevail, 
anyone who has an outstanding parking or traffic "warrant" could 
be arrested at any time because the police wanted to investigate any 
other offense. The fourth amendment's requirement of probable 
cause would, in essence, be nullified as to that individual with re-
spect to virtually any searches or seizures the police wanted to make. 
And, considering the probable number of individuals with outstand-
ing traffic or parking tickets that exist in this country, it is highly 
likely that literally millions of Americans would fall into this cate-
121 The Blair dissenters are not the only judges to take this flawed position. See 
also, eg, Judge Gee's majority opinion in United Slates v Causey, 834 F 2d 1179, 
1185 n 11 (5th Or 1987) (en banc), finding nothing wrong with the arrest of a 
defendant. Causey, on a seven and one-half vear old bench warrant for a misde-
meanor theft charge in order to question him about a bank robbery for which there 
was no probable cause* "Causey had, long before the police apprehended him, 
forened his right to be free from arrest He was already the object of an arrest 
warrant, he had been subject to arrest at all times since us issuance; and he can 
scarcely complain that the police finally got around to executing a valid warrant.'* 
Id 
122. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 105 (footnotes omitted) (empha-
sis added) 
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gory l 2 3 Judge Rubin of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has elo-
quently made this same point in dissent in a case decided 
subsequent to the Supreme Court's short-lived consideration of 
Blair 
In the kind of society in which we live, few persons 
have a life so blameless that some reason to arrest them 
cannot be iound, whether it be for entering an intersection 
when the light is on caution, or for violating a zoning regu-
lation, or for having an expired brake tag The fourth 
amendment protection against arrests without probable 
cause is designed to protect citizens against being arrested 
for such a matter when there is no objective justification for 
the arrest save the police's desire to question the person in 
custody about a matter for which they lack the authority to 
make an arrest 
123 See eg United States v Causey 834 F 2d 1179 1189 90 (5th Cir 1987) 
(Rubin, J dissenting) (footnotes omitted) 
News reports indicate how many millions will be exposed to pretextual 
arrest either because a warrant to arrest them for some offense has 
already been issued or because they have been charged with an offense for 
which a warrant might be obtained The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
has been testing a system that permits inquiries about cnminal suspects 
from every state to be compared with names registered in a computer 
"The primary purpose of the project is to devise a national communica-
tions system through which a policeman in New York, a prosecutor in Chi-
cago or a judge in Los Angeles will be able to determine swiftly whether 
the suspects they are holding have ever been arrested in any other state " 
Five years ago policemen were routinely using the system more than 
300 000 times a day to answer such questions as whether a car is stolen 
Syracuse, New York, has 20 000 delinquent parking tickets In To-
ledo, Ohio 31 890 parking tickets were reported delinquent and after 
intensified police efforts only slightlv more than half were paid In Indi-
anapolis Indiana [ijhe computer told police they could find 5,800 de-
fendants at 2 700 companies It also showed there were 28,000 
outstanding warrants for traffic offenses 9 000 for misdemeanors and 
1,500 for felonies * Indianapolis police reported an estimated 27 000 
such lawbreakers 
Washington D C has records of 500,000 residents of Maryland, Vir-
ginia, and the District of Columbia who have failed to pay parking tickets 
Los Angeles has considered an amnesty program in which 810 000 traffic 
offenses carried on the court's computer docket might be settled by pay-
ment "while haVmg arrest warrants dismissed 
These are but examples Current technology has made it possible for 
every police svstem in the nation to record in a computer the name of 
every traffic offender and every other person wanted for any offense, how-
ever trivial, and for a national system to collate all of these records 
Id 
It should not be difficult to convince the Supreme Court to take judicial notice 
of the fact that even ordinarily law abiding citizens occasionally receive such tickets 
Cf Rehnquist Is Given Ticket for Speeding, N Y Times Sept 13 1986, at 10, col 1 
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Untold thousands of Americans are subject to arrest 
for failing to pay parking tickets, failure to respond to sum-
monses for traffic violations, and similar minor offenses 
Police who desire to arrest an individual without 
probable cause may merely leaf through the files or turn to 
the computer to determine whether they can find some rea-
sons to arrest a suspect tor whose arrest they otherwise lack 
probable cause, just as the police did when they set out to 
find some pretext to arrest [the defendant in this case] 
While I do not condone the possible law violations that led 
to the imposition of the earlier charges, I do not think such 
prior derelictions strip the alleged lawbreakers of fourth 
amendment protection if they should later be suspected of 
other offenses , 24 
Are such claims of the erosion of constitutional protections hy-
perbolic or exaggerated? Well, the Missouri Supreme Court's Blair 
decision, accepted on certiorari, gave the United States Supreme 
Court the opportunity to answer this question as well as to answer 
or reaffirm the answer to two of the most important and controver-
sial doctrinal questions relating to pretexts, namely 
(1) Was the Blair Court correct in applying a case-by-case 
pretext analysis? Or, put another way, was the Blair Court 
correct in assuming that suppression of evidence seized as 
a result of pretextual fourth amendment activity was com-
pelled or otherwise appropriate? 
(2) Was the Blair Court majority correct in ruling that 
when the record evidence established that an arrest was 
made in bad faith, i e , as a pretextual means to arrest and 
acquire evidence about a crime where there was no prob-
able cause, the arrest was ipso facto unconstitutional? Or, in 
contrast, were the Blair Court dissenters correct in arguing 
that where the record established that a lawful parking 
arrest could be made, it does not matter how or why such an 
arrest was actually made? 
124 Causey, 834 F 2d at 1189 (Rubin J , dissenting) In Causey, the Fifth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, on an 8 to 6 vote reversed a prior panel decision at 818 F 2d 354 
(5th Cir 1987), which had found the pretext arrest at issue in that case to be uncon-
stitutional The reach of the Causey majority opinion is limited, however, by the 
comments of one of the judges in the majority (whose vote was necessary to make 
up the bare majority) who specifically noted that 
there is a risk that with the storage and retrieval capability of today's com-
puters, warrants may function in a manner similar to the old general writs 
of assistance Our conclusion today does not tolerate such a stor-
ing of warrants We decide no issues attending a system of obtaining war-
rants and warehousing * them for a purpose other than to arrest for the 
offense for which probable cause is found 
834 F2d at 1186 (Higginbotham, J , specially concurring) (footnote omitted) 
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While these two specific issues set out above were clearly before 
the Supreme Court arising out of the Missouri Supreme Court's de-
cision in Blair, the briefs of the parties to the Court, as is perhaps to 
be expected, muddied the waters just a bit. The state contended 
that Zola Blair's arrest was not pretextual "simply because the po-
lice also wished to question her about an unrelated homicide and 
take her fingerprints."I25 The state also argued that the Blair major-
ity decision "essentially holds that an objectively lawful arrest, made 
pursuant to a valid warrant, can somehow be transformed into an 
invalid arrest merely because of the subjective intent of the arresting 
officers " l 2 6 
Both of these arguments misstate the record and the Missouri 
Supreme Couit's holding in Blait The Blair Court did not find, as 
the state suggested, that the record facts presented a situation in-
volving "mixed motives/' i e , that the police were acting for a mix of 
proper and improper reasons.127 I have argued that in such mixed 
motives cases, there is a cognizable unconstitutional pretext only if, 
borrowing former Justice Powell's formula from Michigan v Clif-
ford,1'2* the improper motive is "the primary object of the search."129 
Professor Haddad has responded that if a motive-oriented test was 
used by the Court, it should require evidentiary suppression in a 
broader category of cases, namely where "the improper motivation 
played a significant role in the officers' decisional process."130 But 
neither Haddad's nor my approach would have been dispositive in 
Blair because the Missouri Supreme Court ruled (as had the lower 
courts) that the reasons for Zola Blair's arrest were entirely improper 
"[T]he arrest, in the circumstances of this case, was at best a pretext 
employed to gather evidence on an unrelated homicide . . . ."m 
Accordingly, the state misstated the record in arguing to the United 
States Supreme Court that the Blair case involved the issue of 
whether a lawful arrest was rendered pretextual simply because the 
125 See supra text accompanying note 104 
126 See sufit a text accompanying note 105 
127 See discussion of mixed motives in BurkoftV/ter/ Faith Searches, supia note 2, 
at i 03-04, Burkoft, Pretext Search Doctrine, supra note 17, at 534, Haddad, supra note 
16, at 649, 674 n 158, 683-85, Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 698 n 16, Note, 
supra note 23, at 257-63 
128 464 U S 287 (1984) 
129 Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 9, at 697-98, 698 n 16 
130 Haddad, supra note 16, at 684 (emphasis original) (citing Brest, Palmer v 
Thompson An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Stotivation, 1971 
SUP CT RFV 95. 130-31) 
131 State v Blair, 691 S VV 2d 259, 262 (Mo 1985), cert granted sub nom Mis-
soun v Blair, 474 U S 1049 (1986). cert dismissed, 480 U S 689 (1987) The court 
added that "(tjhe record in this case suppoits the ruling of the trial court (that tjhe 
execution of the parking violation warrant was but a subterfuge or pretext to 
gathei evident e ol the unrelated crime of homicide " Id at 263 
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police questioned the arrestee about other crimes.132 That is an in-
teresting question, but, it was not before the Supreme Court in 
Blair. 
The second pretext issue raised by the State of Missouri in its 
brief to the Supreme Court in Blair, that the Missouri Supreme 
Court had used a subjective pretext analysis, was also a misstate-
ment of the Missouri Supreme Court's holding. As previously dis-
cussed, the issue of the significance of the subjective motivations of 
ihe arresting law enforcement officers in Blair was simply not part of 
the Blair Court's decision, nor was it necessary to the decision.133 
The pretext arguments raised by Zola Blair before the Supreme 
Court simply and understandably (i e , she won below) followed the 
lead of the Missouri Supreme Court majority urging that a finding 
of pretext was clearly established on the record.134 In addition, 
Blair went a step further. She asked the Court in her brief to ac-
knowledge the fact that the subjective intent of law enforcement of-
ficers is—and has been~a relevant consideration in assessing the 
existence of pretext,135 warning that 4,[i]f [the] subjective intent of 
the police is made totally irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis, 
such activity will never be deterred as it will never come to the atten-
non of the courts."136 
As I have noted, this issue of the significance of the subjective 
intention of the arresting officers was not directly before the 
Supreme Court in Blair.**1 Nonetheless, given the posture of the 
case as argued to the Court, it was conceivable that the Court might 
also express its views on a third question, not included within the 
132 The state was wildly excessi\e in its argument on this point, contending 
that the "effect [of the Missouri Supreme Court's Blair decision] would be to immu-
nize from arrest those parking violators who are suspected of serious crimes, while 
allowing the arrest of all other nonsuspicious violators " Brief for Petitioner at 32-
33, Missouri v Blair, 474 U S 1049 (1986) The state added "This is foolish-
ness " Id at 33 The state was, at least, correct on that score It would, of course, 
not have been a pretext if Zola Blair had been lawfully arrested for murder, 
nhatever her status as a parking violator 
133 See supra text accompanying notes 97-98, 111-13 The state once again 
taxed hyperbolic on this non-issue, warning the Court that "(i]f the decision of the 
Missouri Supreme Court is allowed to stand, it would be the first case where an 
otherwise lawful arrest, made pursuant to a \alid, pre-existing arrest warrant, was 
held unlawful simply because ol the subjective intent of the arresting officers " 
Brief for Petitioner at 32, Missouri v Blair, 474 U S 1049 (1986) (footnote omit-
ted) Not only is this an untrue and inaccurate statement of the Missouri Supreme 
Court's majority opinion, it is also not true that if this case did rely solely on the 
subjective intent of the arresting officers, it would be an unprecedented case 
There are hundreds of such cases (and rightfully so) See, eg , decisions cited supra 
note 56 
134 See supra text accompanying notes 96 and 10\ 
135 Brief for Respondent at 22-41, Missouri v Blair, 474 U S 1049 (1986). 
136 Id at 39 
137 See supra text accompanying note 133. 
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two issues set out previously arising out of the Missouri Supreme 
Court's decision.13® That third question is: 
(3) Is the subjective motivation of the searching or arrest-
ing officers—their bad faith (or lack thereof)—properly 
considered in assessing whether or not there is a cogniza-
ble pretext? 
As previously discussed, none of these three questions—or any 
other issue relating to fourth amendment pretexts—was discussed 
or resolved by the United States Supreme Court in Blair because the 
Court simply and inexplicably dismissed the writ of certiorari as im-
providently granted.1™ Nonetheless, the justices must have clearh 
considered, analyzed, and debated these pretext issues and argu-
ments since they later expressed their collective views on these mat-
ters in the very same term that the Blair case was argued and 
dismissed. These views were propounded in four decisions handed 
down after the oral argument in Blair: Colorado v. Bertine,uo Mary-
land v Garrison.141 O'Connor v Ortega™2 and New York v. Burger.145 If 
there was any question (as there obviously was in some minds) 
whether a viable pretext doctrine existed after the Supreme Court's 
unfortunate obiter dicta in Scott and unfortunate footnote in V\l> 
lamonte-Marquez, these four decisions resolved that question, making 
it clear that the doctrine is very much alive and well. 
IV. THE "RETURN" OF PRETEXT LAW: BERTINE, GARRISON, 
ORTEGA, AND BURGER * 
A. Colorado v. Bertine 
In Colotado v Bertine,144 the Supreme Court ruled that the suspi-
cionless inventory search of the contents of a van belonging to an 
arrestee, Steven Bertine, was constitutional. Bertine had already 
been taken into custody for driving while under the influence of al-
cohol when the van was searched. The van was towed to an im-
poundment lot only after the inventory search took place. 
During the inventory search, the searching officer discovered 
narcotics contained in metal'canisters in a nylon bag in a closed 
backpack that was found directly behind the front seat of the van. 
The Supreme Court majority, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehn-
138 The oral argument in Blair before the Supreme Court reflected various jus-
tices' keen mieiesi in this third issue 
139 See supra text accompanying notes 6-7. 
140 479 U S . 367 (1987). 
141 480 U S 79 (1987) 
142. 480 U S 709 (1987) 
143 107 S Ct 2636 (1987). 
144. 479 U S 367 (1987) 
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quist, held that the discovery of the narcotics was constitutional de-
spite the absence of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) to 
search anywhere: the van, the backpack, the nylon bag, or the metal 
canisters. Rehnquist cited in support of the conclusion that prob-
able cause was unnecessary the following language from South Da-
kota v. Opperman: "The standard of probable cause is peculiarly 
related to criminal investigations, not routine, noncriminal proce-
dures. . . . The probable-cause approach is unhelpful when analysis 
centers upon the reasonableness of routine administrative caretak-
mg functions, particularly when no claim is made that the protective proce-
dures are a subterfuge for criminal investigations ."I45 
As previously noted,14t> South Dakota v Opperman is a paradig-
matic case reaffirming the constitutional validity of what Professor 
Haddad had critically termed "case-by-case" pretext analysis. In 
Opperman, the Supreme Court held that inventory searches of 
automobiles are an exception to the fourth amendment warrant and 
probable cause requirements and, accordingly, may only be made for 
routine administrative caretaking purposes. As a result, the Opper-
man Court ruled that law enforcement officers cannot make such 
suspicionless searches pretextually for the actual purpose of crimi-
nal investigation. The Bertine Court's approving quotation of the 
language in Opperman making this point is, in and of itself, an im-
plicit reaffirmation of the appropriateness of this type of case-by-
case approach to pretext analysis. But the Bertine Court went farther 
still and made this implicit point explicit. 
After finding that the inventory search of Bertine's van and its 
contents was constitutional even in the absence of probable cause 
due to the special status of such routine administrative searches, the 
Court made clear that this exceptional administrative search rule ap-
plied, however, in the Bertine case only because there was no evi-
dence of pretext on the record. In Chief Justice Rehnquist's words, 
"In the present case, as in Opperman and Lafayette147, there was no 
showing that the police, who were following standardized procedures, acted in 
bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation."14* 
This is a critical point for understanding the Court's view of 
how the pretext search doctrine applies. The Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Bertine that suspicionless inventory searches of the contents of 
vehicles are constitutional was explicitly conditioned upon the find-
ing that there was no evidence that the police officers were not mak-
145. Id at 371 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n 5 
(1976)) 
146 See supra note 76 and accompanying text 
147 The reference is to Illinois v Lafavette, 462 U S 640 (1983), a case that 
held constitutional the suspicionless inventory search of personal effects in a shoul-
der bag carried by an arrestee at a police station 
148 479 U S 367, 372 (1987) (emphasis added) 
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ing precisely what the search purported to be, namely an inventory 
(not an investigative) search. Following the Bertine Court's lan-
guage, a defendant could demonstrate that a search was not in fact 
an inventory, i.e., that it was pretextual, by making a showing that 
the police failed to follow "standardized procedures*' or "acted in 
bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation."149 
This language from Bertine is, of course, a striking reaffirmation 
of the so-called case-by-case approach to pretext analysis. If Bertine 
had been able to make this showing of pretext in his case, the search 
would have been declared unconstitutional because it was not in fact 
what it purported to be. Moreover, the Bertine Court's exposition of 
this point is also an express endorsement of the sort of "objective" 
analysis of pretext urged by Professor LaFave150 coupled with the 
sort of "subjective" analysis I have urged.,51 
LaFave's "objective" approach is followed in Bertine by the 
Court's requirement that for the inventory search to be constitu-
tional, the searching officers must have followed "standardized pro-
cedures." Reference to this phrase was not inadvertent. The Bertine 
Court strongly reiterated this requirement later in its opinion, again 
citing Oppervian and Lafayette, and declared, "We emphasize that, in 
this case, the trial court found that the police department's proce-
dures mandated the opening of closed containers and the listing of 
their contents. Our decisions have always adhered to the requirement that 
inventories be conducted according to standardized criteria."152 
Indeed, it is worth noting that the "standardized procedures" 
requirement was set out not only in the Rehnquist majority opinion 
but was emphatically endorsed by all nine of the justices in Bertine. 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Powell and O'Connor, wrote a 
brief, separate concurring opinion in Bertine specifically for the pur-
pose of "underscoring] the importance of having such inventories 
conducted only pursuant to standardized police procedures."153 
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented in Bertine, but 
acknowledged nonetheless that "[standardized procedures are nec-
essary to ensure that this narrow exception is not improperly used 
to justify, after the fact, a warrantless investigative foray."154 
The Bertine Court, as previously noted, did not simply reaffirm 
an objective approach to pretext analysis; rather, it also expressly 
endorsed the use of the sort of "subjective," "bad-faith," "case-by-
case" analysis of pretexts that I have long been urging.155 As the 
149. Id. 
150. See supra text accompanying notes 46-61. 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 39-45. 
152. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374 n.6 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
153. Id. at 376 (Blackmun, J. , concurring). 
154. Id. at 381 (Marshall. J., dissenting). 
155. See supra text accompanying notes 39-45. 
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Bertine majority stressed, this particular inventory search was consti-
tutional as an inventory search not only because there was no show-
ing of the failure to follow "standardized procedures," but also 
because "there was no showing that the police . . . acted in bad faith or 
for the sole purpose of investigation."150 Despite Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's curious disjunctive reference to a showing either of "bad 
faith" or an improper "sole purpose" on the part of the searching 
officers, the import of this language is clear, namely that a subjective 
approach to pretext analysis is not merely legitimate, it is an essen-
tial part of fourth amendment doctrine in this area. The Bertine ma-
jority reiterated this point later in its opinion when it held that <4[w]e 
conclude that here, as in Lafayette, reasonable police regulations re-
lating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the 
Fourth Amendment."157 
It is important to stress that the objective and subjective pretext 
criteria are also repeatedly used by the Bertine Court in the disjunc-
tive. This is an important point because it means that a showing of 
either type of proof of pretext satisfies the test set out in Bertine and 
serves to make such a search unconstitutional. Hence, even where 
the police procedures are themselves objectively reasonable, a 
showing of the absence of good faith, i.e., bad faith or subjective 
pretextual motivation, is sufficient in se to establish unconstitutional 
activity. The Bertine Court made the disjunctive application of its 
pretext test patent when it summed up its pretext analysis as applied 
to the particular facts of Bertine in the penultimate paragraph of the 
opinion as follows: 
Nothing in Opperman or Lafayette prohibits the exercise of 
police discretion so long as that discretion is exercised ac-
cording to standard criteria [the objective test] and on the 
basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of 
criminal activity [the subjective test]. Here, the discretion 
afforded the Boulder police was exercised in light of stan-
dardized criteria, related to the feasibility and appropriate-
ness of parking and locking a vehicle rather than 
impounding it. [Hence, no objective evidence of pretext.] 
There was no showing that the police chose to impound 
Bertine's van in order to investigate suspected criminal ac-
156. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372 (emphasis added). While 1 urged at one time adop-
tion of a bad-faith pretext test like the "sole purpose" language used in the disjunc-
tive in this quotation from Bertine, see Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, supra note 2, at 103-
04. I have moderated in my dotage and favor the more workable "primary object" 
test first announced by former Justice Powell in Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 
294 (1984). See supra text accompanying notes 128-29; Burkoff, Rejoinder, supra note 
9. at 698 n.16. 
157. 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1979) (emphasis added). 
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tivity. [Hence, no subjective evidence of pretext.J158 
As previously discussed, there is absolutely no tension between 
the Bertine Court's acceptance of both an objective and subjective pre 
text analysis.159 Indeed, this is the appropriate way to analyze pre-
texts. The subjective test is best considered a supplementary one 
useful to illuminate the meaning of otherwise neutral-appearing 
(objective) police conduct. Where law enforcement search and 
seizure activity is patently objectively unconstitutional, there is sim-
ply no need to turn to a subjective analysis of the searching officers 
motivations for undertaking the search.160 Where, on the other 
hand, the objective evidence is facially neutral, i.e., it neither sup 
ports nor precludes unconstitutional motivation, a defendant has 
the opportunity to establish—where he or she can—the existence o( 
an unconstitutional motivation in that case, the intent in fact to 
make an investigatory search. 
In sum, the Bertine Court reaffirmed that a defendant may estab-
lish that a purported inventory search was unconstitutional where 
the searching officers: (1) did not possess probable cause, and, 
(2) the defendant can establish either (a) that the officers failed 
follow "standardized procedures" in their inventory activity, or 
(b) that there was "bad faith1* on the part of the searching officers orl 
that the search was undertaken "for the sole purpose of investiga-
tion." ,b l If there was ever truly any question whether the Supreme 
Court accepts case-by-case application of the pretext search doc 
* 
158. Id. at 375-76 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
159. See supra discussion at text accompanying notes 43-45, note 45, and teij 
accompanying note 52. 
160. This is what happened in the Missouri Supreme Court's opinion in Mis-] 
souri v. Blair. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98 and 111-13. Moreover, all 
lowing for some differences in terminology, this is assumably the same point madtf 
in dissent in Bertine by Justice Marshall when he offered his own explanation of thtj 
majority result as follows: 
Standardized procedures are necessary to ensure that this narrow [inven-
tory search] exception is not improperly used to justify, after the fact, a 
warrantless investigative foray. Accordingly, to invalidate a search that is 
conducted without established procedures, it is not necessary to establish 
that the police actually acted in bad faith, or that the inventory was in fact a 
"pretext." 
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 381 (emphasis added). 
Other than the fact that Justice Marshall implicitly equates use of the ternf 
"pretext" only with a subjective analysis, this explanation fully comports with thJ[ 
majority holding. Where an objective showing of pretext is made, it is totally unl 
necessary to also make a subjective, bad-faith showing of pretext in order to establ 
lish the unconstitutionality of the police conduct. Nonetheless, as the Supreme! 
Court majority in Bertine repeatedly staled, a showing that bad faith existed (i t\ 
that the search was actually investigatory) is sufficient in and of itself to render sucl| 
a purported inventory search pretextual and, hence, unconstitutional. 
161. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372. 
trine,162 the Bertine decision should have settled the issue once and 
for all. 
B. Maryland v. Garrison 
One month after the Supreme Court decided Bertine, it handed 
down another fourth amendment decision, Maryland v. Garrison.165 
The Garrison Court shed additional light on the question whether a 
law enforcement officer's subjective intent to engage in unconstitu-
tional activity could render otherwise objectively neutral activity un-
constitutional. Consistent with the analysis and holding in the 
Beihne decision, the Garrison Court answered this question in the 
affirmative. 
In Garrison, a majority of the Supreme Court held constitutional 
a search by Baltimore police officers of the wrong apartment pursu-
ant to a search warrant. The warrant authorized a search for mari-
juana of the person of Lawrence McWebb and "the premises known 
as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment."164 In fact, unbe-
knownst to the police, the third floor of the residence located at 
2036 Park Avenue was divided into two apartments, one occupied 
by McWebb and the other by defendant, Harold Garrison, who was 
neither a target of the search nor otherwise under suspicion. The 
executing officers went into Garrison's apartment by mistake and, 
before they became aware of their error, they discovered heroin.165 
Garrison claimed that since the police did not have a warrant to 
enter his apartment, the heroin was seized as a result of an unconsti-
tutional search and should, accordingly, be suppressed. The 
Supreme Court disagreed. 
Justice Stevens, writing for a six-justice majority of the Court in 
Garrison, held the search and seizure constitutional because, 
although mistaken about whose premises they were searching, the 
executing officers "perceived McWebb's apartment and the third-
floor premises as one and the same; therefore their execution of the 
warrant reasonably included the entire third floor . . . [since] the 
officers' conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain 
and identify the place intended to be searched within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment."166 
162. As previously discussed, Professor Haddad has argued that the Supreme 
Court has never accepted such an approach. See supra text accompany notes 63-64 
and 84. 
163. 480 U.S. 79(1987). 
164. Id. at 80. There was no question that the warrant to search McWebb and 
his premises was valid and supported by probable cause. Id. 
165. As the officers entered the third floor vestibule, they could see the interior 
of McWebb's apartment to their left and Garrison's to the right as the doors to both 
apartments were open. Id. 
166. Id. at 88-89 (footnotes omitted). 
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The reasonableness of the executing officers' mistake about the 
apartment they were in was, however, critical to this holding. Ik 
officers' belief that they were in McWebb's apartment was a reason 
able one, the Court concluded, given the physical configuration of 
the 2036 Park Avenue third floor. As Justice Stevens reasoned: 
P Jhe validity of the search of [Garrison's] apartment pur-
suant to a warrant authorizing the search of the entire third 
floor depends on whether the officers' failure to realize the over-
breadth of the warrant was objectively understandable and reason-
able. Here it unquestionably was. The objective facts 
available to the officers at the time suggested no distinction 
between McWebb's apartment and the third-floor 
premises.1"7 
In essence, the rule that the Garrison Court adopted to govern 
when mistaken searches of premises pursuant to a valid warrant arc 
constitutional is a reasonable good-faith test. The Court upheld the 
constitutionality of this search and seizure due to the confluence of 
the proper subjective criteria, i.e., the executing officers believed in 
good-faith that they were in the right place, and objective criteria, it, 
that belief was reasonable. As Justice Stevens explained, "[This] 
Court has . . . recognized the need to allow some latitude for honest 
mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult pro-
cess of making arrests and executing search warrants."168 
But we are not interested in this Article jn honest mistakes; we 
are interested in pretexts, searches or seizures undertaken for rea-
sons that do not constitute a proper legal justification for such activ-
ity. To analyze the relationship between the pretext issue and the 
law relating to the constitutionality of an honest mistake, consider a 
new case, arising after the Garrison decision, that poses the Garrison 
case facts with everything unchanged except one critical fact: the 
executing officers know full well that they are in the wrong place, 
namely Garrison's apartment. Perhaps it is belaboring the obvious 
to point out that there are any number of explanations for why po-
lice officers might want to search Garrison's apartment even though 
they know it is his and that they have a warrant only for McWebb's 
premises. Perhaps the executing officers don't like the way Garrison 
looks or acts or the color of his skin, perhaps they wonder about him 
because he has a previous arrest record or because he lives in the 
wrong part of town, the wrong building, or next to the wrong neigh-
bor, or perhaps they simply "suspect" that he might be involved in 
other crimes but they have no—or not enough—evidence to lawfully 
arrest or search him on that basis (remember the facts in Missouri v. 
167. Id. (emphasis added, footnote omitted). 
!68. Id. at 87 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). 
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Blair169). If the executing officers searched Garrison's premises on 
this pretextual basis, the question then arises: would such a search 
be unconstitutional?170 
The answer, of course, is "yes." Before explaining why, let me 
respond to the nay-sayers first. Professor Haddad would apparently 
argue that the answer to this question is and should be "no," that 
the law enforcement officers' unlawful subjective intentions are to-
tally irrelevant to fourth amendment analysis, that the Supreme 
Court has not paid any attention to such subjective considerations, 
that, in any event, no attention should be paid to such pretextual ac-
tivity in any individual case. Rather, Haddad contends, the Supreme 
Court might consider changing its rule on mistaken searches pursu-
ant to search warrants in order to generally deter such pretextual 
activity.171 
The most obvious problem with this approach—aside from the 
fact that, as I have previously discussed,172 it does not reflect what 
the Supreme Court has actually said in the past nor what the law 
should be—is that in application, it ignores pretextual activity alto-
gether thus endangering the efficacy of fourth amendment law. Pre-
texts are cases where, whatever the fourth amendment rule is, it is 
not followed (except in a Active sense). To effectively deter pretexts 
only with general rules, the Supreme Court would have to continu-
ously change every fourth amendment rule every time it saw a way 
for law enforcement officers to circumvent the rule while engaging 
in facially neutral activity. But this is impossible; law enforcement 
officers can always pretend to follow the law while not actually doing 
so. Professor Haddad concedes as much.173 As a result, changes in 
fourth amendment general rules can do little or nothing to effec-
tively deter actual pretexts. In any event, the Supreme Court has 
already crafted a general rule in Garrison, as it has in numerous other 
cases, like Opperman,174 to take account of pretexts by recognizing 
the necessity for dealing with them on a case-by-case basis and, as 
will be discussed, by permitting the use of a subjective analysis to 
boot. 
Justice Blackmar of the Missouri Supreme Court and the other 
dissenting justices in Missouri v. Blair175 would also be constrained 
on the basis of the theory propounded in their Blair dissent to up-
169. See supra text accompanying notes 87-102. 
170. A search made on this basis would be pretextual by definition. See supra 
text at note 2. 
171. See supra text accompanying notes 62-72. 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 73-85. 
173. Professor Haddad throws up his hands and says: "So be it." See supra note 
66 and accompanying text. 
174. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), discussed supra note 76 
and accompanying text and text accompanying note 146. 
175. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
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hold the constitutionality of the actions of my pretextual executing 
officers in my Garrison-based hypothetical. As the dissenters argued 
in Blair; even if the officers are in fact acting without constitutional 
justification, they could have acted constitutionally, i.e., in this exam-
pie, if they had not known that they were in the wrong place, their 
action would have been objectively constitutional under the rule in 
Garrison; hence, there is no pretext. This approach leads to the same 
dysfunctional and dangerous results as Professor Haddad's ap-
proach. As I have criticized earlier,176 this result-oriented analysis, 
by failing to pay any attention to what has actually occurred, as op-
posed to the fu-tive possibilities, totally fails to deter any police mis-
conduct where the searching officers had the perspicacity to make 
their actions look good, even though they clearly were not. Indeed, 
usingjust ice Blackmar's or Professor Haddad's analyses, the search 
would be declared constitutional even if the misbehaving officers re-
peatedly confessed their unconstitutional misbehavior under oath, 
e.g., "We searched Garrison's apartment only because he is black," 
since a suppression court would be constrained to ignore the sub-
jective motivations of the searching officers altogether. 
But, fortunately, the Supreme Court neither endorsed nor uti-
lized the Blackmar or Haddad approaches. What did the Supreme 
Court actually say in Garrison relevant to this pretext issue? To re-
peat my question: Hvould a search of Garrison's apartment be un-
constitutional if all the facts were the same as in the actual case 
except that the executing officers knew that they were in the wrong 
place? 
The Supreme Court made it crystal clear in Garrison that such a 
pretextual search would be unconstitutional. As the Court noted 
with respect to the warrant application and issuance, "Plainly, if the 
officers had known, or even if they should have known, that there were two 
separate dwelling units on the third floor of 2036 Park Avenue, they 
would have been obligated to exclude [Garrison's] apartment from 
the scope of the requested warrant."177 Moreover, with respect to 
the warrant's execution, the Court made exactly the same point: ''If 
the officers had known, or should have known", that the third floor con-
tained two apartments before they entered the living quarters on the 
third floor, and thus had been aware of the error in the warrant, they 
would have been obligated to limit their search to McWebb's 
apartment."178 
In short, as the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized in Gam-
176. See supra text accompanying notes 114-24. 
177. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987) (emphasis added). 
178. Id. at 87 (emphasis added). The Court added: "Moreover, as the officers 
recognized, they were required to discontinue the search of (Garrison's] apartment 
as soon as they discovered that there were two separate units on the third floor 
" Id. 
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son, if Garrison had shown—as he did not—that the executing of-
ficers in fact did not make an honest mistake, if he had shown 
instead that they knew that they were in the wrong apartment, the 
search would have been unconstitutional. It would have been un-
constitutional because it was a pretext since the officers did not have 
the lawful constitutional authority to search Garrison's apartment 
and the search was undertaken instead for reasons that did not con-
stitute a proper justification for such activity. It would have been 
unconstitutional despite the fact that the search looked objectively 
constitutional, i.e., if we didn't know better, this looked like these 
officers honestly thought they were searching McWebb's apartment, 
and it would have been unconstitutional despite the fact that a law-
ful search of Garrison's apartment could have been made, i.e., if the 
officers had honestly and reasonably believed they were searching 
McWebb's apartment. The fact that a lawful search could have been 
made does not mean that when the police do not in fact make such a 
lawful search, we can ignore the pretext and pretend that the search 
is constitutional. 
C. O'Connor v. Ortega 
Just a few weeks after the Supreme Court's decision in Garrison, 
the Court decided another case that directly touched upon fourth 
amendment pretext issues, O'Connor v. Ortega.*19 A five-justice ma-
jority of the Court (composed of a four-justice plurality and one 
concurring justice) ruled that some searches of the offices of public 
employees undertaken without probable cause by their employers 
are constitutional.180 Justice O'Connor, in her plurality opinion for 
four members of the Court, concluded that "public employer intru-
sions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of govern-
ment employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as 
well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be 
judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circum-
stances."181 Justice Scalia, who provided the fifth vote upholding 
the constitutionality of the search of public employees' offices with-
out probable cause, disagreed "with the plurality's view that the rea-
sonableness of the expectation of privacy (and thus the existence of 
Fourth Amendment protection) changes 'when an intrusion is by a 
supervisor rather than a law enforcement official.' "I82 Nonetheless, 
Justice Scalia concluded that warrantless "government searches [of 
179. 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
180. The Ortega decision concerned the fourth amendment but was not a fourth 
amendment case. Rather, it was a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(1982) on the basis of an alleged violation of an individual's fourth amendment 
nghts. 
181. 480 U.S. at 725-26 (O'Connor, J.). 
182. Id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting the plurality opinion). 
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public employees' offices] to retrieve work-related materials or to 
investigate violations of workplace rules" are constitutional within 
the dictates of the fourth amendment.183 
The issue of pretext arose in Ortega because it was not clear 
from the record why the particular public employee office search at 
issue in that case was carried out. Since the four-justice plurality 
concluded that only public employee searches undertaken by an em-
ployer "for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes . . . [or] for in-
vestigations of work-related misconduct"184 were constitutional 
when undertaken on less than probable cause, the Court re-
manded185 the case in order for the trial court to determine "tht 
actual justification for the search."1™ 
The existence of a pretext issue in Ortega should be clear from 
the Supreme Court's finding of the necessity for a remand to resolve 
the factual question of the searching agents* justification for their 
search. Dr. Ortega, whose office was searched, based much of his 
argument on a pretext claim.187 He contended, in the plurality's 
words, "that the intrusion was an investigatory search whose pur-
pose was simply to discover evidence that would be of use in admin-
istrative proceedings."188 The plurality ordered a remand so that 
the trial court could, inter alia, "determine the justification for the 
search and seizure."189 This is classic pretext search doctrine. If 
the search of Dr. Ortega's office was in fact undertaken for work-
related reasons, it was constitutional; if, instead, it was in fact under-
taken for investigatory reasons, it was unconstitutional (despite its 
otherwise objectively neutral appearance). 
Justice Scalia, whose fifth vote was necessary to form a majority, 
also turned the question of the constitutionality of this search under 
the fourth amendment on the lower court's resolution on remand of 
the question whether the search of Dr. Ortega's office was in fact "to 
retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of work-
place rules."190 To Justice Scalia, such a motivation on the part of 
the searching agents would be, in his words, "a validating pur-
pose." , y l The absence of such a proper purpose, in contrast, dic-
183. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
184. Id at 725 (O'Connor, J.). 
185. The Ortega decision resulted in a remand of the civil rights action because 
that was the relief ordered by both the plurality and Justice Scalia in his separate 
opinion and. hence, was the relief agreed to by a majority of the Court. 
186. O'Conner v. Ortega. 480 U.S. 709, 729 (1987) (emphasis added). 
187. See Brief for Respondent In Propria Persona at 45-47, O'Conner v. Ortega, 
480 U.S. 709 (1987); Brief of Amicus Curiae Joel Klein at 30-31. O'Conner v. 
Ortega, 480 U.S 709 (1987). 
188. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 725-26. 
189. Id. at 729. 
190. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
191. Id. 
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tated a finding of unconstitutionality. It is hard to imagine a firmer 
endorsement from either the Ortega plurality or from Justice Scalia 
of the propositions that case-by-case analysis of pretexts is appropri-
ate and that the subjective motivation of the searching agents is im-
portant to fourth amendment pretext analysis, i.e., whether a lawful 
"validating purpose" existed for the search. 
Furthermore, there were four dissenting justices in Ortega and 
their dissenting analysis did no violence to—indeed it under-
scored—the majority's pretext doctrinal analysis. Justice Blackmun, 
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, dissented be-
cause he concluded that there was no "special need" to search pub-
lic employees* offices sufficient to justify a per se exception to the 
normal fourth amendment requirements of a warrant and probable 
cause.192 Although this conclusion was dispositive for the dissent-
ers, Justice Blackmun also took issue with the plurality's analysis of 
the record facts. After reviewing the evidence in the record, primar-
ily deposition testimony about how the search was conducted, when 
it was conducted, and why it was conducted, Justice Blackmun con-
cluded that the search was indeed "plainly exceptional and investi-
gatory in nature."193 Accordingly, he castigated the plurality for 
permitting the potential application of "inventory search" rules to 
an investigative search case. In other words, Justice Blackmun's dis-
sent evaluated the objective and subjective evidence on the record 
as establishing that—whatever the searching agents or their lawyers 
claimed—this search was not actually an inventory search. The fact 
that it was not an inventory search means that it was not entitled to 
the relaxed constitutional rules that apply to such searches. This 
analysis is, of course, as in the Bertine case, a straightforward applica-
tion of a "case-by-case" pretext search doctrine using both objective 
and subjective criteria to establish the pretext. 
D. New York v. Burger 
A few weeks after it decided Ortega, the Supreme Court in New 
York v. Burger194 handed down a decision that once again directly 
confronted the issue of the proper analysis of pretext searches. The 
primary issue in Burger was whether the warrantless search of an au-
tomobile junkyard pursuant to a New York state statute authorizing 
such searches fell within the exception to the fourth amendment 
warrant requirement carved out for administrative inspections of 
pervasively regulated industries. A six-justice majority of the Court, 
in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, held that it did and that, accord-
ingly, the search in question was constitutional. 
192. Id. at 744 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
193. Id. at 746. 
194. 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987). 
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In discuss ing the evidence actually discovered in this junkyard 
search, the Burger Court cited to the cryptic parenthetical language 
in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez relating to pretexts , 1 9 5 previ-
ously d iscussed, for the proposition that i 4[t]he discovery of evi-
d e n c e of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administratis 
inspection d o e s not render that search illegal or the administrative 
s c h e m e suspect."1 9*' T h e key question, of course, for pretext pur-
poses , is when is a search otherwise proper? T h e Burger Court an-
swered this important question in a lengthy footnote appended to 
the language q u o t e d above, noting the exis tence o f two different 
types o f pretexts that might make a search not "otherwise proper." 
T h e first type o f pretext mentioned is the possibility o f pretext 
o n the part o f the New York Legislature that enacted the warrantless 
junkyard inspect ion statute. T h e defendant in Burger argued thai 
the legislature actually enacted the statute for criminal investiga-
tory—rather than administrative—purposes. T h e Burger Court 
seemingly accepted defendant's argument that "pretextual" legisla-
tion might be constitutionally deficient, but nonetheless ruled that 
there was n o ev idence of such pretext on the record in this case. 
"The legislative history of [this statutej, in general , and [the inspec-
tion sub-sec t ion] , in particular, reveals that the New York Legisla-
ture had properly [sic] regulatory purposes for enacting the 
administrative s c h e m e and was not using it as a 'pretext' to enable 
law enforcement authorities to gather ev idence o f penal law 
vio lat ions ." 1 9 7 
T h e s e c o n d type of pretext noted by tjie Burger Court is the type 
o f pretext d i scussed throughout this Article, namely searches made 
by agents o f the state, usually law enforcement officers, for reasons 
that d o not const i tute a proper legal justification for such activity. 
T h e Burger Court d e e m e d the case before it constitutional in part 
because there was n o pretext since the reasons for making the search 
in this case did in fact constitute a proper legal justification for mak-
ing such an administrative search. In Justice Blackmun's words, 
speaking for the majority of the Court, "There is . . . no reason to 
bel ieve that the instant inspection was actually a 'pretext* for ob-
taining ev idence o f [defendant's] violation o f penal laws. It is undis-
puted that the inspection was made solely pursuant to the 
administrative s c h e m e . " 1 9 8 In short, the implication o f this lan-
guage is that if the "inspection" was not made for proper administra-
195. See discussion of Vxllamonte-Xtarquez, supra text accompanying notes 15-31. 
196. 107. S. Ct. at 2651 (emphasis added, footnote and citation to Villamonte-
Marquez omitted). 
197. Id. at 2651 6.27 (citations omitted). The Court added that "an administra-
tive scheme may ha\e the same ultimate purpose as penal laws, even if its regula-
tory goals are narrower." Id. at 2659. 
198. Id. at 2651 n.27. 
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live reasons, but rather was made for investigatory reasons (without 
probable cause or other lawful antecedent justification), the search 
would have been unconstitutional. 
That implicit suggestion, that such pretextual administrative 
searches are unconstitutional, was made explicit in Justice Black-
mun's next sentence, where he added that "[i]n fact, because the 
search here was truly a[n administrative] inspection, the [New York] 
Court of Appeals was able to reach in this case, as it could not in 
People v. Pace, the question of the constitutionality of the statute.'*199 
This reference by the Supreme Court in Burger to the Pace deci-
sion is important if cryptic standing alone and needs some explana-
tion. The reason that the New York Court of Appeals in Pace did not 
reach the question of the constitutionality of the junkyard adminis-
trative search statute—indeed, "could not" reach this question, in the 
United States Supreme Court's view—was that the Pace case—unlike 
Burger—involved a pretextual administrative search. The New York 
Court of Appeals suppressed the evidence seized in Pace because, on 
the facts on record, "[t]he warrantless search of defendants' auto-
mobile salvage yard was not undertaken for administrative pur-
poses."200 Indeed, it is notable that the record facts in Pace 
established pretext strictly on the basis of the (subjective) testimo-
nial evidence given by the searching officers' detailing their actual, 
unlawful motivations for searching. As the Appellate Division of the 
New York Supreme Court concluded, "[T]he [searching] police of-
ficers expressly maintained that their mission was to gather evidence 
of a crime rather than to administer any regulatory scheme. When a 
search is not undertaken as a routine regulatory inspection the administrative 
search rationale is simply inapplicable . . . .'*201 In short, the Pace decision 
was o n e which held dispositive the fact that pretextual search and 
seizure activity is ipso facto unconstitutional when subjective evidence 
is utilized to establish the pretext. T h e United States Supreme 
Court majority cited this decision with evident approval in Burger, 
expressly contrasting it with the facts in Burger where there was no 
pretext and where, for that reason, the search was found to be 
constitutional. 
Furthermore, the three dissenting just ices in Burger completely 
agreed with the majority's analysis that such pretext searches are 
unconstitutional. Indeed, the dissenters took the analysis o n e step 
further; they also concluded, unlike the majority, that the Burger case 
was in fact a case o f unconstitutional pretext and that the evidence 
seized should, accordingly, be suppressed on that basis. I n j u s t i c e 
Brennan's words, t 4[T]he State has used an administrative scheme as 
199. Id. (citation omitted). 
200. People v. Pace, 65 N.Y.2d 684, 481 N.E.2d 250, 491 N.Y.S.2d 618, (1985). 
201. People v. Pace, 101 A.D.2d 336, "< to 475 N.Y.S.2d 443, 446 (1984) (em-
phasis added, citations omitted). 
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a pretext to search without probable cause for evidence of criminal 
violations. It thus circumvented the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment by altering the label placed on the search."202 Such 
conduct, Justice Brennan made clear, citing numerous Supreme 
Court decisions, violates established fourth amendment doctrine re-
lating to the unconstitutionality of pretexts.203 What is more, Jus-
tice Brennan added, failure to recognize the significance of ignoring 
such pretexts threatens the efficacy of any fourth amendment rules 
As his dissent concluded, "The implications of the Court's opinion, 
if realized, will virtually eliminate Fourth Amendment piotectionof 
commercial entities in the context of administrative searches. No 
State may require, as a condition of doing business, a blanket sub-
mission to warrantless searches for any purpose/*204 Exactly. 
202 New York v Burger, 107 S Ct 2636, 2656 (1987) (Brennan, J , dissenting) 
203 Justice Brennan explained 
In the law of administrative searches, one principle emerges with unusual 
clarity and unanimous acceptance the government may not use an admin-
strative inspection scheme to search for cnminal violations See Michigan 
v Clifford, 464 U S 287,292. 104 S Ct 641, 646, 78 L. Ed 2d 477 (1984) 
(opinion of Powell, J ) (in fire investigation, the constitutionality of a post-
fire inspection depends upon "whether the object of the search is to deter-
mine the cause of the fire or to gather evidence of criminal activity'*), 
Michigan v Tyler, 436 U S 499, 508, 98 S Ct 1942, 1949, 56 L Ed 2d 
486 (1978) ('* 'if the authorities are seeking evidence to be used in a crimi-
nal prosecution, the usual standard of probable cause will apply' ") (cita-
tions omitted), Donovan v Dewey, 452 U S , at 598, n 6, 101 S Ct, at 
2538, n 6 ("[warrant and probable cause requirements] pertain when com-
mercial property is searched for contraband or evidence of crime*'); Al-
meida-Sanchez v United States, 413 U S 266, 278, 93 S Ct 2535,2542, 
37 L Ed 2d 596 (1973) (Powell, J , concurring) (traditional probable 
cause not required in border automobile searches because they are "un-
dertaken pnmanl) for administrative rather than prosecutorial pur-
poses"), Camara v Municipal Court, 387 U S , at 539, 87 S Ct, at 1736 
(authorization of administrative searches on less than probable cause will 
not "endange(r| time-honored doctrines applicable to criminal investiga-
tions"). See v City ot Seattle. 387 U S , ai 549, 87 S Ct , at 1742 (Clark, J , 
dissenting) ("nothing suggests that (he inspection was designed as 
a basis for a criminal prosecution"), Abel v United States, 362 V S 217, 
226, 80 S Ct 683, 690, 4 L Ed 2d 668 (1960) ("[t]he deliberate use by 
the Government of an administrative warrant for the purpose of gathenng 
evidence in a criminal case must meet stern resistance by the courts"), id 
at 248, 80 S Ct at 701 (Douglas J , dissenting) (Government cannot evade 
the Fourth Amendment "by the simple device of wearing the masks of 
[administrative] officials while in fact they are preparing a case for cnminal 
prosecution"), Frank v Maryland, 359 U S 360. 365, 79 S Ct 804,808,3 
L Ed 2d 877 (1959) ("evidence of criminal action may not be seized 
without a judicially issued search warrant") 
Id at 2655 (footnote omitted) 
204 Id at 2657-58 
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V. CONCLUSION: MISSOURI V BIMR REDUX 
The import of the four recent Supreme Court decisions dis-
cussed above is that they provide the answers to the fourth amend-
ment pretext search doctrine questions that were before the Court 
in Missouri v. Blair, but which were left unanswered when the Court 
cryptically dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted.205 
The first question before the Court in Blair was as follows: 
(1) Was the Blair Court correct in applying a case-by-case 
pretext analysis* Or, put another way, was the Blair Court 
correct in assuming that suppression of evidence seized as 
a result of pretextual fourth amendment activity was com-
pelled or otherwise appropriate? 
There is absolutely no question when the Supreme Court's de-
cisions in Bertine, Garrison, Ortega, and Burger are considered that the 
Blair Court's use of a case-by-case analysis of pretexts, compelling a 
finding of unconstitutionality where relevant pretexts are estab-
lished, was correct. All of the opinions in all four of those cases 
cither used or implicitly accepted such an analysis. There was never 
rven a suggestion in any of those cases that Professor Haddad's 
"hard-choice" approach reflected settled fourth amendment policy 
or had subsumed the necessity for—or the appropriateness of—con-
sideration of pretexts on a case-by-case basis 
The second question before the Supreme Court in Blair was as 
follows: 
(2) Was the Blair Court majority correct in ruling that 
when the record evidence established that an arrest was 
made in bad faith, i^. ,asa pretextual means to arrest and 
acquire evidence about a crime where there was no prob-
able cause, the arrest was ipso facto unconstitutional? Or, in 
contrast, were the Blair Court dissenters correct in arguing 
that where the record established that a lawful parking 
arrest could be made, it does not matter how or why such an 
arrest was actually made? 
Again, ail of the opinions in Berime, Garrison, Ortega, and Burger 
directly or indirectly support the view of the Blair Court majority 
that such "bad faith" fourth amendment activity is unconstitutional. 
The Bertine Court made this point most cogently, finding inventory 
searches of the contents of impounded vehicles unconstitutional 
*here the searching officers "acted in bad faith or for the sole pur-
pose of investigation."206 Furthermore, the Garrison majority opin-
ion would appear to make it clear that the Missouri Supreme Court 
205 See supra text accompanying note 139 
206 Colorado*, Bertine, 479 U S 367,372(1987) 
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dissenters' view in Blair that fourth amendment activity can be justi-
fied on the basis of what could have happened rather than what did 
happen is quite simply incorrect.'207 
Finally, the third question put before the Court by the parties in 
Blair (although unnecessary to a decision) was as follows: 
(3) Is the subjective motivation of the searching or arrest-
ing officers—their bad faith (or lack thereof)—properly 
considered in assessing whether or not there is a cogniza-
ble pretext? 
Once again, all of the opinions in Bertine, Garrison, Ortega, and 
Burger directly or indirectly used or accepted the use of such subjec-
tive criteria where it was necessary, i.e., where the objective evidence 
was facially neutral, and where it was otherwise available and rele-
vant. In particular, the Bertine majority expressly adopted a test for 
pretext including a subjective "bad faith" analysis, the Garrison ma-
jority used subjective evidence of motivation to determine the con-
stitutionality of a search, the Ortega Court turned the ultimate 
resolution of that case on evidence of the searchers* actual motives 
for searching, and the Burger majority noted that subjective evidence 
of pretext could be dispositive of the issue of constitutionality, while 
the Burger Court dissenters found evidence of pretext on the record 
and, indeed, ruled that it was dispositive. 
In short, while a Supreme Court decision in Missouri v. Blair 
would have been the surest and most direct way to obtain resolution 
of the most troubling questions raised by a few judges and commen-
tators relating to the existence and content of the pretext search 
doctrine, the four recent Supreme Court decisions discussed above 
answered all of the questions raised in Blair—and then some. Lower 
court opinions that state or imply that the Scott, Villamonte-Marquez, 
or any other Supreme Court decision handed down prior to Bertine, 
Garrison, Ortega, and Burger, have commanded the evisceration of a 
workable pretext search doctrine are, quite simply, in the light of 
these recent rulings, dead wrong.208 These decisions make it clear 
beyond peradventure that pretext searches are unconstitutional 
and, further, that it is appropriate to utilize evidence of searching 
officers* motivation in determining constitutionality. Whether or 
not the pretext search doctrine ever left, it has returned. 
207. See supra text accompanying notes 175-79. 
208. See. e.g., United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987). The Causey 
majority opinion, which was based in large pari upon a mistaken reading of Scott 
and Villamonle-Mmquez, flatly "validated so-called pretextual arrest warrants." 
United States v. Zukas. 843 F.2d 179. 182 n.l (5th Cir. 1988). 
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